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Brief Synopsis
This study extends previous analyses of home loan pricing disparities by 
supplementing HMDA data with additional loan-level information from a large,
proprietary subprime database. By merging the datasets, we were able to evaluate
whether race and ethnicity affect subprime loan pricing after controlling for key
risk factors, including credit scores and loan-to-value ratios. The results show that
African-American and Latino borrowers are more likely to receive higher-rate
subprime home loans than white borrowers, even when we control for legitimate
risk factors.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
L ast year, for the first time, lenders were required to report details on the costs of subprime homeloans—mortgages intended to serve borrowers with blemished credit or other high-risk charac-
teristics. Lenders disclosed pricing information related to the most expensive subprime loans
(referred to here as “higher-rate” loans), while lower-rate loans in the subprime market and virtually
all prime loans were exempt from this reporting requirement. Several analyses of this information,
collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), have shown that African-American
and Latino borrowers received a disproportionate share of higher-rate home loans, even when con-
trolling for factors such as borrower income and property location. 
A number of concerned groups have pointed to these disparities as evidence of discrimination that
slows economic progress among groups who already lag far behind in homeownership and wealth.
Others contend, however, that the pricing disparities are not meaningful, since they do not fully
account for legitimate differences in credit risks. In this report, we attempt to move the debate 
forward by providing a more detailed examination of pricing patterns in the subprime home loan
market. Our study analyzed subprime home loan prices charged to different racial and ethnic groups
while controlling for the effects of credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, and other underwriting factors.
To our knowledge, this is the first full research report that examines 2004 HMDA data to assess the
effects of race and ethnicity on pricing in the subprime market while controlling for the major risk
factors used to determine loan prices. 
Our findings show that, for most types of subprime home loans, African-American and Latino 
borrowers are at greater risk of receiving higher-rate loans than white borrowers, even after 
controlling for legitimate risk factors. The disparities we find are large and statistically significant:
For many types of loans, borrowers of color in our database were more than 30 percent more likely
to receive a higher-rate loan than white borrowers, even after accounting for differences in risk. 
This analysis was possible because we supplemented the 2004 HMDA data with information from a
large, proprietary subprime loan dataset. Individually, both databases lack certain pieces of data that
would be helpful for an in-depth comparison of subprime loan pricing. By combining loan informa-
tion from both sources, however, we obtain more complete information on a large set of loans.
Using a combined dataset of over 177,000 subprime loans, we analyzed  whether borrowers of color
are at greater risk of receiving higher-rate subprime loans than similarly-situated white borrowers. 
Our basic findings are outlined here: 
1) African-Americans were more likely to receive higher-rate home purchase and refinance loans
than similarly-situated white borrowers, particularly for loans with prepayment penalties. 
• The effect of being an African-American borrower on the cost of credit was greatest for loans 
containing penalties for early payoff, which comprised over 60 percent of the loans we examined.
• As shown in the chart below, African-American borrowers with prepayment penalties on their 
subprime home loans were 6 to 34 percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than if they had
been white borrowers with similar qualifications. Results varied depending on the type of interest
rate (i.e., fixed or adjustable) and the purpose (refinance or purchase) of the loan.
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2) Latino borrowers were more likely to receive higher-rate loans than similarly-situated 
non-Latino white borrowers for mortgages used to purchase homes. Differences for 
refinance loans were not significant at a 95 percent confidence level. 
• Latino borrowers purchasing homes were 29 to 142 percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan
than if they had been non-Latino and white, depending on the type of interest rate and whether the
loan contained a prepayment penalty. 
• Pricing disparities between Latinos and non-Latino white borrowers for refinance loans were not 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level in our dataset.
Increased Likelihood that African-American Borrowers Received a Higher-Rate Subprime  
Loan with a Prepayment Penalty* versus Similarly-Situated White Borrowers
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This analysis does not allow us to estimate precisely how much
race and ethnicity increase the prices charged to borrowers. It is
also beyond the scope of this paper to determine definitively
why these disparities exist. However, we do posit several possible
causes, including the considerable leeway mortgage originators
have to impose charges beyond those justified by risk-based pric-
ing. 
A notable and pervasive example of discretionary pricing occurs
through “yield-spread premiums,” which are monetary incentives
for mortgage brokers to inflate rates on subprime loans. Other
causes of pricing disparities may include the inconsistent appli-
cation of objective pricing criteria, targeting of families of color
by higher-rate lenders or brokers, and lack of investment by
lower-cost lenders in these communities. It is likely that all of
these factors contribute to making subprime home loans more
costly than necessary. 
For African-Americans, the most striking disparities that emerged in our research were associated
with prepayment penalties; for Latinos, the greatest disparities related to loan type (purchase versus
refinance). Examining these differences, we discuss several hypotheses. First, we believe the larger
disparities observed for African-Americans in subprime loans with prepayment penalties may be
related to yield-spread premiums, since lenders are often more willing to pay these premiums on
loans that include prepayment penalties. Mortgage originators routinely make exceptions to guide-
lines, but it may be that African-Americans receive fewer favorable exceptions than white borrow-
ers. Second, we believe that the disparities evidenced for Latinos on purchase mortgages might arise
from a greater concentration of recent immigrants among this borrower pool. If so, the higher dis-
parities in the purchase market may be a result of higher-cost lenders targeting recent immigrants.
While these results are particularly disturbing for borrowers of color, the results have negative impli-
cations for all borrowers in the subprime market, since common business practices such as discre-
tionary pricing can affect anyone. The cost of mortgages matters more than the cost of typical con-
sumer goods. Whether or not families receive fairly priced home loans is a major factor in their fun-
damental financial security. Higher loan costs will both dissuade some potential borrowers from
investing in homeownership and increase the risk of foreclosure for those who do.
Lenders and policymakers can take a number of constructive actions to help ensure more 
equitable pricing for all borrowers. These include: 
• Curtailing steering by requiring objective pricing standards; 
• Holding lenders and brokers responsible for providing loans that are suitable for their customers; 
• Amending HMDA to expand the disclosure requirements for risk and pricing information; 
• Ensuring that adequate resources are dedicated to fully enforcing fair lending laws; and 
• Creating incentives and supporting a policy framework that lead the market to better serve
African-American and Latino communities. 
While these results are 
particularly disturbing for
borrowers of color, the
results have negative 
implications for all 
borrowers in the subprime
market, since common 
business practices such as
discretionary pricing can
affect anyone. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. HMDA 
In 1975, Congress enacted the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). HMDA was a legislative
response to the widespread practice of mortgage "redlining," that is, the systematic exclusion of
neighborhoods of color when marketing or originating home loans.1 Shortly thereafter, Congress
passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to encourage lending in previously neglected
communities,2 and amended the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), to prohibit discrimination
based on race and national origin, among other criteria.3 While CRA mandated that financial insti-
tutions help meet the credit needs of their entire communities and ECOA outlawed discrimination
in the extension of financial credit, the original HMDA aided in the implementation of both laws
by requiring regulated institutions to disclose summaries of their mortgage lending by census tracts. 
These laws focused on access to credit, and they were enacted during a time when there was less
concern about discriminatory disparities in mortgage pricing, partly because nearly all states had reg-
ulatory limits on interest rates and points charged for mortgages. That situation changed in 1980
with the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDM-
CA), which preempted state laws governing interest rates and points on first-lien loans unless states
explicitly chose to opt out of the law.4 By deregulating most mortgage lending, DIDMCA laid the
groundwork for a high-priced subprime mortgage refinance market, and resulted in a market segment
with a much wider range of loan prices than was found in the prime market.5
Meanwhile, disclosure requirements under HMDA have evolved over time to reflect the changing
nature of mortgage lending and discriminatory practices, broadening both the range of lenders under
its purview and the information those lenders are required to disclose.6 Specifically, HMDA’s scope
has expanded to encompass non-depository institutions, such as mortgage companies, which have
significantly increased their share of the mortgage market over the past three decades. In addition,
the disclosure requirements of lenders have evolved to include a wide range of loan application data
on loan approval decisions, borrower demographics, and property characteristics.7
One of the most important changes to HMDA is the recent inclusion of limited pricing information
related to the annual percentage rate (APR) of certain loans.8 For loans originated in 2004, lenders
were required to report the spread between the APR of designated loans and the yield on a U.S.
Treasury security of comparable maturity. Specifically, lenders submitted this information on first-
lien loans if the spread was at or above three percentage points, and they submitted this information
on subordinate liens if the spread was at least five points. Throughout this paper, we refer to loans
with APRs high enough to require the disclosure of this spread as “higher-rate” loans. 
This information on higher-rate loans makes it possible for the first time to use HMDA not just to
detect disparities in loan dispositions (i.e., the proportion of loans that were approved or denied)
between demographic groups, but also differences in loan pricing.9 Since borrowers can be vulnera-
ble to discrimination at both the underwriting and pricing stages of the loan process, the ability to
detect discriminatory patterns in both areas is critical for ensuring that all racial and ethnic commu-
nities have an equal opportunity to build home equity. 
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Select HMDA Studies on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Mortgage Lending 
Though analyses of mortgage pricing based on HMDA data have not been possible prior to the release of
the 2004 data, many studies have examined HMDA data to evaluate other issues related to possible
inequities in the mortgage market. Such studies have tended to focus on differences in loan disposition (i.e.,
whether loan applications have been approved or denied) by race and ethnicity or on whether certain
groups are disproportionately served by subprime lenders.
1) Impact of Race and Ethnicity on Loan Decisions 
Because HMDA has long been the primary source of public information on loan applications and under-
writing decisions, it has been used extensively to analyze whether certain groups of borrowers are more or
less likely to have their application for a home loan denied. The most famous research of this kind was pub-
lished in 1996 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, “Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA
Data,” often referred to simply as the “Boston Fed Study.”10 This study combined publicly-available HMDA
data from the Boston area with a number of additional variables, including information on credit history
collected from area lenders. The study found that the risk of loan denial for African-Americans and Latinos
was about 80 percent greater than that of white applicants, controlling for a host of applicant, loan, proper-
ty, and neighborhood characteristics.11
2) Impact of Race and Ethnicity on Loan Originations
Several studies have used HMDA data to analyze whether specific racial and ethnic groups receive a dispro-
portionate share of subprime loans. Because HMDA data does not specifically identify subprime loans, most
of these studies have approximated which loans were subprime by using annual lists of predominately sub-
prime lenders published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
A 2000 joint report by HUD and the U.S. Department of Treasury explored the relationship between sub-
prime lending and neighborhood racial composition.12 Relying on HMDA data, the study reported that sub-
prime lending accounted for 51 percent of all refinance loans in predominately African-American commu-
nities in 1998, compared to only nine percent in predominately white neighborhoods. The study also found
that these disparities persisted even when controlling for neighborhood income. 
A 2002 national study by the Center for Community Change analyzed the proportion of borrowers receiv-
ing subprime refinance loans by race and ethnicity and found pervasive disparities among African-
American, Latino and white borrowers.13 In addition, the authors found that disparities persisted within
income categories and actually increased as income went up. Specifically, while lower-income African-
American borrowers were 2.4 times as likely to receive a loan from a subprime lender as lower-income white
borrowers, upper-income African-American borrowers were 3.0 times as likely to receive such loans as
upper-income white borrowers. At the same time, lower-income Latino borrowers were 1.4 times as likely to
receive a subprime loan as lower-income white borrowers, and upper-income Latinos were 2.2 times as likely
to receive such loans as upper-income whites.
In “The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending,” Paul Calem, Kevin Gillen and Susan
Wachter controlled for variables included in HMDA data as well as census tract-level risk information to
evaluate the effect of borrower race and neighborhood racial composition on receiving subprime loans in
Chicago and Philadelphia.14 Specifically, the authors combined HMDA data with variables such as foreclo-
sure rates and information on the credit scores of the tracts’ populations and found that both the race of
individual borrowers and neighborhood racial composition have statistically-significant impacts on the like-
lihood of receiving a loan from a subprime lender, even after controlling for the borrower information avail-
able in HMDA and tract-level risk factors.
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B. The 2004 HMDA Data: Pricing Disparities Surface
In September 2005, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) released the
2004 data for all HMDA reporters in electronic form, making it possible to analyze the entire U.S.
mortgage market.15 The release of this data has contributed valuable information to the debate on
whether the mortgage market extends credit equally and fairly to borrowers of all races and ethnici-
ties. Organizations such as the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), the
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), and the Consumer
Federation of America (CFA) have pointed to the existence of large disparity ratios (i.e., the ratios
between the proportion of borrowers of color that received higher-rate loans to the proportion of
whites receiving such loans) as potential evidence of unfair pricing.16 Others have dismissed such
claims, asserting that raw disparity ratios are meaningless since they do not control for differences in
legitimate risk factors, such as credit histories and loan-to-value ratios, among different racial and
ethnic groups.17
The most comprehensive analysis of the 2004 HMDA data to date, conducted by staff to the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), found that pricing disparities persist even after
controlling for borrower-specific information such as income, origination amount, gender, property
location and presence of a co-applicant.18 In “New Information Reported Under HMDA and Its
Implication for Fair Lending Enforcement,” the Fed authors first confirmed the existence of large
raw disparities between the proportion of African-American and Hispanic white borrowers receiving
higher-rate loans to that of non-Hispanic white borrowers in both the home purchase and refinance
markets.19
The Fed authors next made a series of adjustments to account for differences between white borrow-
ers and borrowers of color by controlling for the following demographic information contained in
HMDA data: borrower income, loan amount, location (MSA) of the property, presence of a co-
applicant, and gender. Essentially, these adjustments estimated the portion of loans to African-
American and Hispanic borrowers that would be expected to be higher-rate if, on average, the
observed borrower traits were the same for these borrowers as for non-Hispanic white borrowers.
These adjustments lowered observed disparity ratios between borrowers of color and whites by seven
to 17 percent, but large disparities still existed.20 The authors also adjusted for differences in lender
composition between the groups. This second set of adjustments estimated the proportion of loans
to African-Americans and Hispanic white borrowers that would be expected to be higher rate if the
distribution of these loans among individual lenders were the same as the distribution of loans for
non-Hispanic white borrowers. Interestingly, these “lender adjustments” reduced the disparity ratios
considerably, though significant differences remained.21
Table 1. Federal Reserve Evaluation of the Disparities in the Incidence of Higher-Rate Loans* for Site-Built
Properties: Black and White Hispanic Borrowers vs. Non-Hispanic White Borrowers
Borrower Race/ Loan Purpose Raw Disparity  Disparity Ratio 
Ethnicity Ratio Controlling for 
HMDA Borrower 
Characteristics
Black/African-American Purchase 3.7 3.1 1.4
Black/African-American Refinance 2.7 2.3 1.8
Hispanic or Latino Purchase 2.3 1.9 1.3
Hispanic or Latino Refinance 1.5 1.4 1.1
* Here we summarize findings only for conventional, owner-occupied, first-lien mortgages.
Source: Avery et al. (see note 18), Table 10.
Disparity Ratio Controlling 
for HMDA Borrower
Characteristics Plus
Originating Lender
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However, the Fed’s analysis of HMDA data did not control for several important risk factors, such as
credit scores or loan-to-value ratios (LTVs), since these variables are not part of HMDA’s disclosure
requirements. The paper does, however, present partial results from an analysis conducted by the
Credit Research Center (CRC). CRC analyzed data, including FICO scores and LTVs, from eight
subprime lenders and found little disparity between the proportions of borrowers of different races
and ethnicities getting higher-rate loans, seemingly in contrast with findings presented later in this
paper. However, the Fed’s paper does not fully explain CRC’s methodology, and the data is likely
limited in ways that make it of questionable value in understanding the disparity ratios in HMDA
data and broader patterns in the subprime market. For more information about the CRC study, see
Appendix 1.
Our analysis adds significantly to this body of research by supplementing HMDA data with 
information from a proprietary database. By combining information from each of these two datasets,
we were able to incorporate important risk factors into a multivariate analysis of mortgage pricing.
III.  A MORE IN-DEPTH LOOK AT PRICING DISPARITIES 
A. Data
To include additional information on risk factors that might account for higher prices charged to
African-American and Latino borrowers, we combined the 2004 HMDA data with a large, propri-
etary database of subprime loans. Like HMDA data, the other database contains specific information
on individual loans, including borrower and property characteristics. Several types of information
can be found in both datasets, including data on the location of the property, the originating lender,
lien status, loan purpose, property type, and loan amount. 
However, each dataset contains some information that the other does not. For example, the propri-
etary database includes critical pieces of information on loan risk at origination that are not includ-
ed in HMDA, such as the LTV, credit score (FICO), and whether the loan was covered by private
mortgage insurance. On the other hand, HMDA contains information on the race and ethnicity of
borrowers. In addition, while HMDA contains information on APR spreads (which incorporates
information on certain fees), the proprietary database has information on the mortgage note rate
and whether the loan includes a prepayment penalty, but no information on APRs or up-front fees.
(See Appendix 5 for information about the limitations of APR.)  Finally, while the proprietary data-
base we use is among the largest subprime home loan datasets available, accounting for an estimated
87 percent of U.S. subprime originations in 2004,22 it only contains securitized subprime loans. For
its part, the HMDA dataset is the single largest publicly-available dataset on U.S. mortgage origina-
tions, and it includes both prime and subprime loans for covered lenders.
Using information common to both HMDA and the proprietary database, we were able to match
loans from the two databases, creating a new dataset of 177,487 subprime loans originated in 2004.23
This merged dataset includes individual loan information on borrower characteristics (race, 
ethnicity, income, FICO credit score, income documentation level); loan characteristics (LTV, loan
amount, purpose, existence and duration of prepayment penalties); property characteristics (loca-
tion, property type); and pricing (APR spread for higher-rate loans).24 To complement this loan-level
data, we added publicly-available information on prevailing interest rates and state-specific informa-
tion on housing prices, demographics and state judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment laws.25
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Using this combined dataset, we first examined the distribution of first-lien subprime loans that car-
ried APRs above the three-percentage-point HMDA rate-reporting threshold (“higher-rate” loans).
More specifically, we tabulated raw disparity ratios by categories of LTV and credit score. (“Disparity
ratios” are the proportions of higher-rate loans received by borrowers of color divided by those of
white borrowers.) This allowed for a simple analysis of whether overall disparity ratios might be
attributable to differences in the LTV and credit scores between racial and ethnic groups.
A note on racial and ethnic designation:
The HMDA data allows borrowers to report both an ethnicity designation (either “Hispanic or Latino”
or “Not Hispanic or Latino”) and up to five racial designations (including both “white” and “African-
American or Black”). To simplify notation and serve our research purposes, we coded and refer to any
borrower who was identified as “Hispanic or Latino” as “Latino,” and any borrower who was identified
as “African-American or Black” in any of the race fields as “African-American.”  We coded borrowers
and refer to them as “white” if they were associated with “Not Hispanic or Latino” and only identified
as “white” in the race fields. The remaining loans were not coded into racial or ethnic categories and
were excluded from the analysis. In practice, the Latino and African-American categories are not mutu-
ally exclusive, but the overlap in our merged dataset is small (about two percent), and using this
method ensures maximum inclusion for members of each group.
Tables 2 and 3 show disparity ratios for African-American and Latino borrowers versus white bor-
rowers. For African-Americans, disparity ratios in every LTV/FICO category exceeded one, while for
Latinos disparity ratios exceeded one in the majority of categories. For example, for home purchasers
with credit scores of 680 or higher and loan-to-value ratios of 90 percent or higher, disparity ratios
for Latinos and African-Americans were 1.28 and 1.37, respectively. In other words, Latinos and
African-Americans were 28 percent and 37 percent more likely, respectively, to receive a higher-rate
subprime loan than whites.
We note that the disparities listed in Tables 2 and 3 differ from the Fed’s results listed in Table 1 for
at least two reasons. First, we are making a somewhat different comparison. While the Fed calcula-
tions use the proportion of higher-rate loans to all other loans for each group, Figures 2 and 3 use
the proportion of higher-rate loans to all other subprime loans. In other words, while the Fed was
able to look at pricing disparities across the entire market, data limitations require us to focus on dis-
parities within the subprime sector. Second, Tables 2 and 3 group loans into combinations of FICO
credit score and LTV, which effectively introduces a measure of control for risk. 
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LTV Percent FICO Range Borrower Number of 
Race/Ethnicity Observations
Less than 80 Less than620 African-American 326 64.4 1.20
Latino 339 54.9 1.03
White 1,279 53.1 NA
620-679 African-American 152 30.9 1.53
Latino 289 27.0 1.34
White 847 20.2 NA
680+ African-American 101 8.9 1.65
Latino 358 13.4 2.50
White 1,515 5.4 NA
80-89 Less than 620 African-American 1,700 62.6 1.26
Latino 1,309 46.5 0.94
White 4,223 49.7 NA
620-679 African-American 1,351 35.7 1.60
Latino 2,783 25.7 1.12
White 5,483 22.9 NA
680+ African-American 731 21.34 2.85
Latino 2,615 14.5 1.93
White 5,900 7.5 NA
90+ Less than 620 African-American 2,351 83.7 1.06
Latino 1,709 75.7 0.96
White 5,001 79.0 NA
620-679 African-American 2,004 67.4 1.15
Latino 3,115 59.8 1.02
White 6,382 58.5 NA
680+ African-American 931 46.8 1.37
Latino 2,372 43.8 1.28
White 3,936 34.1 NA
Proportion of
Loans that
are High Cost
Disparity Ratio
(vs. White
Borrowers)
Table 2. Subprime Purchase Loan Disparity Ratios by LTV/FICO Combination
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Because disparities between racial and ethnic groups persisted within a majority of LTV-FICO com-
binations, the results suggested the need for a more in-depth approach to determine how much con-
ventional risk factors explain pricing variations between groups. 
B. Statistical Analysis
Our statistical analysis adapts a mortgage pricing model created by Brent Ambrose, Michael LaCour-
Little and Anthony Sanders in their study, “The Effect of Conforming Loan Status on Mortgage
yield-spreads: A Loan Level Analysis.”26 In that study, the authors examined whether conforming to
the conventional loan guidelines set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had an impact on mortgage
prices. Although our purpose is different and, consequently, the specific variables that we analyze are
not identical to those included in their study, we adapted their general analytical approach. 
Like Ambrose et al., we used multiple regression analysis to estimate the impact of different borrow-
er, property, loan and geographic factors on the APR spread of a loan. Multiple regression allows the
effect of individual factors (the “independent variables”) on an outcome of interest (the “dependent
variable”) to be isolated from the effect of all other independent variables included in the models. In
our case, we were interested in separating the effect of race and ethnicity on APR spreads from the
effect of genuine risk factors such as LTVs and credit scores. However, whereas Ambrose et al. had
the actual APR spread for all of the loans in their database, we only have the spread for those loans
that exceeded HMDA’s APR spread-reporting threshold. As a result, while the Ambrose study was
able to use regression analysis to estimate the actual APR spread, our analysis allowed us to compare
Proportion of
Loans that
are High Cost
Disparity Ratio
(vs. White
Borrowers)
Table 3. Subprime Refinance Loan Disparity Ratios by LTV/FICO Combination
LTV Percent FICO Range Borrower Number of 
Race/Ethnicity Observations
Less than 80 Less than 620 African-American 2,904 62.8 1.05
Latino 2,973 56.8 0.95
White 12,314 59.6 NA
620-679 African-American 731 20.0 1.18
Latino 1,303 16.0 0.94
White 4,957 17.0 NA
680+ African-American 316 8.5 2.24
Latino 976 5.3 1.39
White 4,055 3.8 NA
80-89 Less than 620 African-American 2,496 68.4 1.11
Latino 2,021 58.2 0.95
White 9,365 61.5 NA
620-679 African-American 818 27.5 1.22
Latino 1,205 22.3 0.99
White 4,808 22.6 NA
680+ African-American 252 14.3 1.70
Latino 586 8.5 1.01
White 2,007 8.4 NA
90+ Less than 620 African-American 1,481 71.8 1.05
Latino 977 63.2 0.93
White 5,319 68.1 NA
620-679 African-American 1,159 51.9 1.17
Latino 1,219 45.1 1.02
White 4,858 44.2 NA
680+ African-American 264 29.6 1.21
Latino 455 31.7 1.30
White 1,557 24.4 NA
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the odds and likelihoods of different racial and ethnic groups receiving higher-rate loans, but did not
allow us to estimate the magnitude of differences in APR spreads themselves. 
To examine the effects of race and ethnicity, we conducted two distinct analyses. First, we used an
initial “base” logistical regression model to estimate how much borrowers’ race or ethnicity affected
whether their loans were higher-rate, holding constant a host of borrower, property, loan, and geo-
graphic independent variables. However, logistic regression procedures assume that there is no
“reverse-causation” between the dependent and independent variables. In other words, this method
assumes that, while the independent variables may affect the dependent variable, the reverse is not
true. We recognize that this assumption may not be valid in our case since a loan’s APR may affect
some of the variables we hold constant, namely LTV, loan amount, and whether the loan carried a
prepayment penalty. For example, a borrower’s decision to borrow a certain dollar amount might be,
in part, based on the rate quoted. Therefore, like the Ambrose study, our final analysis includes sta-
tistical adjustments to account for the possible interdependence of these variables, providing a more
reliable estimate of the effect of race and ethnicity on the risk of receiving a higher-rate loan. 
1. The Base Model
As mentioned above, we first conducted logistic regressions to estimate whether race and ethnicity
affected the risk of receiving a higher-rate loan. Table 4, below, lists the specific variables that were
included in this base model.
Table 4. Logistical Specification for Base Model
Dependent Variable Variable Description
HMDA_Threshold Dummy variable=1 if APR spread is reported in HMDA, else=0
Independent Variables
Borrower Characteristics
BLACK Dummy variable =1 if the borrower is African-American, else=0
LATINO Dummy variable =1 if the borrower is Latino, else=0
MONTHLY INCOME Monthly income, in dollars
FICO27 FICO credit score
FULL_DOC Dummy variable=1 if the borrower provided full documentation of income, else=0
Loan/Property Characteristics
LTV Loan-to-value ratio at origination
ORIG_AMT Loan origination amount, in dollars
PREPAY Dummy variable=1 if the loan carries a prepayment penalty, else=0
MULTI Dummy variable=1 if the loan is secured by a property with 2-4 units, else=0
CONDO Dummy variable=1 if the loan is secured by a condominium, else=0
AGENCY CODES28 Categorical dummy variables representing the regulatory agency of the 
originating lender
Economic Variables:
CREDIT_SPREAD Monthly difference between AAA and Baa bond yields
YIELD_CURVE Monthly difference between 10-year and 1-year Treasury yields
HPI_VOL 8 quarter standard deviation in the OFHEO state Housing Price Index
RATE_VOL 15 month standard deviation in 1-year Treasury yield
Q2-Q4 Categorical dummy variables for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2004
Geographic Variables:
CDIV2-CDIV9 Categorical dummy variables for the Census division in which the property 
is located 
STATELAW2-STATELAW4 Categorical dummy variables for state laws created by Ambrose et al. based on 
rules pertaining to judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment
N_CCITY Dummy variable=1 if the property is located in an MSA but outside of a central 
city, else=0
RURAL Dummy variable=1 if the property is located outside an MSA, else=0
BLACK_STATE Proportion of state population that is African-American 
LATINO_STATE Proportion of state population that is Latino 
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2. Expanded Model: Final Analysis 
Our final model used more sophisticated techniques to analyze the same variables while accounting
for potential interdependence of APR and some of the independent variables. Appendix 4 explains
our methodology in more detail, but in the simplest terms, this model removed statistical problems
that might be caused by reverse causation (i.e., two-way effects) between a loan’s price and LTV,
origination amount, and the existence of a prepayment penalty. 
3. Analyses for Different Loan Categories
Recognizing that loan prices may depend in part on the type of interest rate (adjustable or fixed)
and/or the loan purpose (purchase or refinance), we performed all analyses separately for each of the
following four loan categories:  1) Purchase fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs); 2) Purchase adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs); 3) Refinance FRMs; and 4) Refinance ARMs. In addition, to limit varia-
tions in loan products within each category, we included only the dominant types of ARM and
fixed-rate loans.29
Specifically, our analysis of ARM loans included only 2/28 hybrid ARMs (loans with a fixed interest
rate for two years followed by a 28-year term with semi-annual interest rate adjustments calculated
by adding a margin to an index based on six-month LIBOR rates), with either no prepayment
penalty or a prepayment penalty of two years. Our analysis of fixed-rate mortgages included all 30-
year loans, with either no prepayment penalty or a prepayment penalty with a term of three years.30
All analyses were further restricted to loans secured by first-liens on owner-occupied, single-family
properties. Finally, we also excluded loans secured by manufactured housing units, those backed by
private mortgage insurance, those with non-standard amortization schedules, and those with origina-
tion amounts exceeding the jumbo loan thresholds.31
4. Presentation of Findings: Odds and Likelihoods
When using logistic regressions to predict whether an event will happen or not, it is conventional
to express the results in terms of  “odds ratios.”   In this case, we are essentially trying to understand
whether race or ethnicity help explain whether a borrower receives a higher-rate home loan, even
after controlling for conventionally accepted risk factors. Odds ratios are simply the odds of one
group receiving a higher-rate loan divided by the odds of a reference group. (In our case, the refer-
ence group is similarly-situated white borrowers.)  
Odds ratios include two important features: magnitude and significance. The magnitude is simply
the value of the ratio. An odds ratio of 1.0 indicates there is no disparity. A ratio above 1.0 indi-
cates that, for instance, the odds of getting a higher-rate loan were greater for African-American
and Latino borrowers than the odds for similar white borrowers, while a ratio under 1.0 indicates
that the odds for these groups was lower than for white borrowers. For example, if the odds ratio
between African-American borrowers and white borrowers is 1.3, it means that the odds of an
African-American borrower receiving a higher-rate loan is 30 percent greater than the odds for a
similarly-situated white borrower. If, however, the odds ratio were 0.7, the odds of an African-
American borrower receiving a higher-rate loan would be 30 percent lower than that of a similarly-
situated white borrower. The significance shows whether an odds ratio was different from 1.0 by a
statistically-significant amount. Statistical significance is the conventional method in social science
research for judging whether observed differences represent meaningful disparities or are the result of
random variation.
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While odds ratios are conventionally used when presenting information from logistic regressions,32  it
is often more intuitive to think in terms of probabilities or likelihoods. Therefore, we used the infor-
mation from our models to predict the likelihoods that the African-American and Latino borrowers
in our dataset received a higher-rate loan and compared that to the expected likelihood if those
same borrowers had been white. By comparing these two predicted probabilities, which are estimat-
ed based on identical risk factors between groups, we were able to isolate the effect of race and eth-
nicity on the likelihood of receiving a higher-rate loan for borrowers in our dataset. See Appendix 7
for a more detailed explanation of odds and likelihoods.
5. Limitations
Like all statistical analyses, the study presented here has limitations. First, APR spread is an imper-
fect measure for examining pricing data, since it essentially blends interest rates with points and fees
in a way that assumes that borrowers will keep the loan for its entire term and, consequently, it
tends to underemphasize costs arising from fees.33 However, in the context of this study, it is unlikely
this limitation would undercut our basic findings, since it is unlikely that preferences for fee-rate
tradeoffs systematically vary by race or ethnicity in ways that are uncorrelated with credit score,
income, LTV, or other factors already included in our analysis. Moreover, to the extent that borrow-
ers of color are targeted for high-fee predatory lending,34 such patterns would tend to lead to under-
estimated pricing disparities between these borrowers and white borrowers since, again, APR tends
to minimize the costs of fees.35
Second, because HMDA only provides APR-spread information for higher-rate loans, our analysis is
limited to comparing the relative odds and likelihoods of receiving these higher-rate loans. Unlike
Ambrose et al., we did not estimate the magnitude of the differences in APRs between loans. 
Third, unlike the Fed study, our database was not large enough to control for metropolitan statistical
area or for individual lenders. However, our analysis does account for general correlations between
APR, on the one hand, and location, race, and ethnicity on the other by controlling for state hous-
ing prices, census regions, state laws regarding judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment and state
racial and ethnic compositions. In addition, by including regulating agencies as independent vari-
ables, we essentially control for lender type.
Fourth, since our merged data only contains subprime loans, this analysis neither allows for an eval-
uation of pricing disparities that includes the prime market, nor provides any insight into how differ-
ent borrowers end up with prime rather than subprime lenders.
Finally, our models may omit information that is correlated with both APR and the race and ethnic-
ity of borrowers (e.g., employment tenure). Though we were able to control for the majority of risk-
based characteristics that lenders generally use to price loans, at least according to rate sheets, it is
nevertheless possible that omitted variables could influence our results. This limitation applies to
virtually all empirical social science research.
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IV.  FINDINGS
First, we note that—apart from the findings for race and ethnici-
ty—the results for our explanatory variables were consistent with
rational risk-based pricing practices in the mortgage industry. For
example, coefficients on LTV were consistently positive and sig-
nificant, showing that higher LTVs increase the likelihood of
receiving a higher-rate loan. Also, estimates on credit scores were
negative and significant, showing that borrowers with lower cred-
it scores were also more likely to receive higher-rate loans. We
also note that our models did a good job overall of predicting
whether borrowers would receive a higher-rate loan. Appendix 6
presents the full results, including model-fit statistics for all mod-
els. 
In general, our analyses show that race and ethnicity were significant factors in determining
whether borrowers received higher-rate home loans. That is, African-American and Latino borrow-
ers were more likely to receive higher-rate loans than white borrowers with similar risk factors for
many categories of subprime loans. The significance of race was particularly consistent for loans
with prepayment penalties, while the impact of ethnicity was concentrated in loans for home pur-
chases. 
A. Effect of Race on Subprime Loan Pricing 
1. Purchase Loans: Our estimates show that race had a significant effect on the risk of receiving
a higher-rate loan for most fixed-rate and all adjustable-rate subprime purchase mortgages.
Specifically:
• Fixed-Rate Purchase Loans: 
Our base model estimated that the odds of receiving a higher-rate, fixed-rate purchase loan for
African Americans were 71 percent greater than for whites. In our final model, the increase in the
odds for African-American borrowers on loans without prepayment penalties continued to be posi-
tive, but was no longer significant at a 95 percent confidence level. However, for the more than 60
percent of fixed-rate purchase loans that did contain prepayment penalties, the increase in odds for
African-American borrowers rose to 84 percent and was statistically-significant. Based on our likeli-
hood simulation, we estimated that these African-American borrowers were 31 percent more likely
to receive a higher-rate loan than if they had been white borrowers.*  
African-American 
borrowers were 31 percent
more likely to receive a
higher-rate loan on fixed-
rate purchases. 
Table 5. Effect of Race on Risk of Receiving a Higher-Rate Subprime Purchase Loan (African-American vs. White) 
Base Model All Loans 3,679 1.71 28.7% 17,978 1.24 9.0%
1,444 1.64 30.9% 4,657 1.40 16.3%
Final Model
2,235 1.84 30.8% 13,321 1.41 15.3%
*Bolded results are statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level.
Models FRMs ARMs
Number of Odds Increased Number of Odds Increased 
Observations Ratio Likelihood Observations Ratio Likelihood
Loans without
Prepayment
Penalties
Loans with
Prepayment
Penalties
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• Adjustable-Rate Purchase Loans: Both the base and final models estimated that African-
Americans were more likely to receive a higher-rate adjustable rate purchase loan than similarly-sit-
uated whites. The base model estimated that the odds for African-Americans were 24 percent high-
er than for whites. In our final model, the increase in odds rose to 40 percent for loans without pre-
payment penalties and 41 percent for loans with prepayment penalties, both of which were statisti-
cally significant. Translated into likelihoods, African-Americans in our sample were 15 to 16 per-
cent more likely to receive a higher-rate ARM purchase loan than if they had been white.
2. Refinance Loans: Our base model estimated that race had a positive and significant effect on the
likelihood of receiving a higher-rate loan for all fixed-rate and adjustable-rate subprime refinance
loans. In our final model, the increased odds persisted for loans with prepayment penalties.
• Fixed-Rate Refinance Loans: Our base model estimated that the odds of an African-American
borrower receiving a higher-rate fixed-rate refinance loan were 44 percent greater than for a similar-
ly-situated white borrower. Our final model showed that, for fixed-rate refinance loans without pre-
payment penalties, the impact of race was not detectable at a 95 percent confidence level. However,
over two-thirds of fixed-rate refinance loans did have prepayment penalties, and our final model
estimated that the odds of African-American borrowers with these loans receiving a higher-rate
were 62 percent higher than for white borrowers. Translated into relative likelihoods, these African-
American borrowers were 34 percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than if they had been
white.
Table 6. Effect of Race on Risk of Receiving a Higher-Rate Subprime Refinance Loan (African-American vs. White)
Base Model All Loans 8,799 1.44 22.9% 18,470 1.16 5.6%
2,881 1.24 11.2% 6,520 1.04 1.2%
Final Model
5,918 1.62 34.3% 11,950 1.17 6.1%
*Bolded results are statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level.
Models FRMs ARMs
Number of Odds Increased Number of Odds Increased 
Observations Ratio Likelihood Observations Ratio Likelihood
Loans without
Prepayment
Penalties
Loans with
Prepayment
Penalties
• Adjustable-Rate Refinance Loans: Our base model estimated that the odds of an African-
American borrower receiving a higher-rate adjustable-rate refinance loan were 16 percent greater
than for a similarly-situated white borrower. Again, our final model showed different results for
loans with and without prepayment penalties. Specifically, the final model showed a small and posi-
tive difference between African-Americans and whites in loans without prepayment penalties (only
35 percent of adjustable-rate subprime refinance loans in our analysis), though one that is not signif-
icant at a 95 percent confidence level. However, for the 65 percent of ARM refinance loans that do
have prepayment penalties, the final model estimated that the odds of an African-American bor-
rower receiving a higher-rate loan were 17 percent higher than the odds for a white borrower with
similar risk features. Our likelihood simulation estimated that these borrowers were six percent more
likely to receive higher-rate loans than if they had been white.
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B. Effect of Ethnicity on Subprime Loan Pricing 
1. Purchase Loans: All final model results showed that Latino
borrowers were more likely to receive higher-rate subprime
purchase loans than white borrowers. 
• Fixed-Rate Purchase Loans: The base model estimated that the
odds of a Latino borrower receiving a higher-rate, fixed-rate pur-
chase loan were 60 percent greater than a similarly-situated
white borrower. In our final model, the increase in odds rose to
189 percent for loans without prepayment penalties and 71 per-
cent for those with prepayment penalties. Translated into relative
likelihoods, the final model suggested that Latino borrowers of
fixed-rate purchase loans without prepayment penalties in our
sample were 142 percent more likely to receive higher-rate loans
than if they had been white. Latino borrowers of fixed-rate pur-
chase loans with prepayment penalties in our sample were 45
percent more likely to receive higher-rate loans than if they had
been white. 
Table 7. Effect of Ethnicity on Receiving a Higher-Rate Subprime Purchase Loan (Latino vs. White)
Latino borrowers of fixed-
rate purchase loans with
prepayment penalties 
in our sample were 
45 percent more likely to
receive higher-rate loans
than if they had been
white. 
Base Model All Loans 3,679 1.60 39.6% 17,978 1.06 3.6%
1,444 2.89 141.9% 4,657 1.52 28.6%
Final Model
2,235 1.71 44.6% 13,321 1.66 37.4%
*Bolded results are statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level.
Models FRMs ARMs
Number of Odds Increased Number of Odds Increased 
Observations Ratio Likelihood Observations Ratio Likelihood
Loans without
Prepayment
Penalties
Loans with
Prepayment
Penalties
• Adjustable-Rate Purchase Loans: The base model estimated that the odds of a Latino borrower
receiving a higher-rate adjustable-rate purchase loan were not different at a 95 percent confidence
interval from a similarly-situated white borrower. However, the final model indicated that the
increased risk for Latino borrowers was, in fact, statistically significant. Specifically, the odds of
Latino borrowers receiving a higher-rate on adjustable-rate purchase loans were 52 percent greater
for loans with prepayment penalties and 66 percent greater for those without prepayment penalties
than for similarly-situated whites. For our sample, Latino borrowers of ARM purchase loans with
and without prepayment penalties were, respectively, 37 percent and 29 percent more likely to
receive higher-rate loans than if they had been white. 
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2. Refinance Loans: Our models did not find evidence of an impact of ethnicity on loan
prices in the refinance market at a 95 percent confidence level. 
• Fixed-Rate and Adjustable-Rate Refinance Loans:  Neither the base nor the final model found a
difference in the odds of Latinos receiving a higher-rate subprime refinance loan compared to white
non-Latino borrowers that was significant at a 95 percent confidence level. This was true both for
fixed-rate and adjustable-rate subprime refinance loans.
V.  DISCUSSION 
The pricing disparities revealed by our results point to underly-
ing market inefficiencies that have implications for all borrow-
ers. While disparities highlight disadvantages faced by borrowers
of color, this by no means suggests that the subprime market is
delivering uniformly desirable or good outcomes for white bor-
rowers. To the contrary, we believe that evidence of disparate
pricing for borrowers of color is likely a symptom of a larger set
of issues in a market that has gained notoriety as a magnet for
predatory lenders. The point is further underscored by the scale
of legal settlements related to widespread predatory lending by
subprime lenders. For example, Household Finance entered a
settlement agreement in 2002 for $484 million that stands as
the largest consumer restitution agreement in U.S. history.36
Sizeable settlements also have been entered into by Citigroup
and, most recently, Ameriquest.37
Efficient financial markets should provide similarly-situated borrowers with equally competitive
prices on subprime home loans. In fact, subprime lenders construct complicated pricing matrices in
the form of “rate sheets” in an effort to meet this challenge. These rate sheets describe how to calcu-
late applicable interest rates from a borrower’s credit score, the amount of equity held by the borrow-
er in the home, and several other factors that measure risk. Lenders’ internal fair lending compliance
operations aim to ensure that these criteria are valid and not based on impermissible discriminatory
factors. This investment is prudent, since lenders face serious legal and reputational risks if they vio-
late fair lending standards.
Yet, in multiple analyses that control for the major factors lenders explicitly use to set prices, we find
that borrowers’ race and ethnicity continue to exert a statistically-significant influence on the cost
of their subprime mortgages. For several types of loan products, borrowers of color in our database
were more than 30 percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than white borrowers, even
after accounting for differences in risk. Disparities tended to be larger for fixed-rate loans than for
their adjustable-rate counterparts. 
Our findings indicate that African-American and Latino borrowers face the highest risks for pricing
disparities under different circumstances. Relative to white borrowers, African-American borrowers
were at greatest risk of receiving a higher-rate loan when their subprime mortgage included a pre-
payment penalty. Specifically, African-American borrowers with prepayment penalties on their sub-
prime home loans were 6 to 34 percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than similarly-situ-
ated white borrowers, depending on the type of interest rate (i.e., fixed or adjustable) and the pur-
pose (refinance or purchase) of the loan. Latino borrowers were at greatest risk when they used their
We believe that evidence 
of disparate pricing for 
borrowers of color is likely 
a symptom of a larger set of
issues in a market that has
gained notoriety as a 
magnet for predatory
lenders.
Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages 20
mortgage to purchase a home rather than to refinance an
existing home loan. In these cases, they were 29 to 142 per-
cent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than similarly-
situated white borrowers, depending on the type of interest
rate and whether the loan contained a prepayment penalty.38
While no empirical analysis is without limitations,39 the rich
data used here, the stability of our findings in analyses that
examine different combinations and forms of explanatory vari-
ables (see Appendix 6), and the consistency of findings across
multiple product lines all indicate that the pricing disparities
we identify are genuine and significant. What then could
explain these results?  
One explanation for the disparities could stem from differences in how individual lenders price
loans. This explanation involves specific lenders charging borrowers of color rates that are higher
than those charged similarly-situated white borrowers—i.e., “disparate loan pricing.”   In an alterna-
tive explanation, pricing disparities would be expected if borrowers of color disproportionately
received their loans from lenders whose loans are generally priced higher than lenders that primarily
serve white borrowers. For convenience, we generally refer to such a pattern as “market segmenta-
tion.”
We stress that data was not available that would allow us to distinguish between these two underly-
ing reasons or quantify their effects. However, given that both represent plausible factors, it is
worthwhile to consider both scenarios in more detail:
A. Disparate Loan Pricing
While rate sheets do present objective pricing schedules for calculating a loan’s interest rate, they
are not definitive statements of a loan’s price for a given borrower. Discretionary yield-spread premi-
ums and other up-front charges, as well as negotiated exceptions to rate sheet guidelines, are com-
mon examples of how a loan’s price can vary from prices displayed on a rate sheet. These variations
could account for part or all of the differences in subprime loan pricing among white, African-
American, and Latino borrowers.
1. Discretionary charges such as yield-spread premiums or other up-front charges are subjective
elements that could lead to disparate pricing.
Frequently, mortgage originators adjust the interest rate on home loans without regard to any objec-
tive risk-based criteria. When these adjustments are used to increase the interest rate of a loan, they
increase the value of the mortgage (also called the yield) to the lender. The difference between the
new higher rate and the lowest rate for which the borrower qualified is called a “yield-spread.”
When a loan with an increased rate is sold to an investor or delivered by a broker to a lender, the
investor or lender will pay a premium price for that loan. The difference between the price paid for
this loan with an inflated interest rate and the price that would have been paid for the loan had the
borrower received the lowest rate for which he or she qualified is called a yield-spread premium, or
YSP for short.40
For several types of loan prod-
ucts, borrowers of color in our
database were more than 30
percent more likely to receive a
higher-rate loan than white
borrowers, even after account-
ing for differences in risk. 
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While YSPs theoretically can play a helpful role,41 the
exchange is a complicated one that is easily abused. Borrowers
often wrongly assume or are misled into believing that mort-
gage brokers are working to find them the lowest-cost loan for
which they qualify, even if they actually receive an over-priced
or even predatory loan.42 Even when borrowers are aware that
brokers are not required to offer the best rate, determining
whether a proposed loan carries a YSP, let alone performing the
complex financial calculations necessary to compare prices
across mortgages with and without YSPs, is surely overwhelm-
ing for many borrowers.43 
When YSPs are applied in ways that disparately affect borrowers in protected classes, including race
and ethnicity, this form of discretionary pricing may carry serious fair lending implications. In fact,
this is a prominent example of how borrowers may be “steered” into a higher-rate loan. In part,
because of such concerns, a number of states have addressed YSPs in the context of predatory lend-
ing legislation.44 
Unfortunately, it has been difficult to study the overall effects of YSPs. The precise amount paid in
yield-spread premiums is disclosed only on the HUD-1/1A closing statement, which lenders must
provide to borrowers. Though that information is generally unavailable to researchers, at least one
researcher who has obtained copies of these documents has reached troubling conclusions.
Examining loans from an affiliated set of lenders, Harvard Law School Professor Howell Jackson
found that African-American and Latino borrowers paid mortgage brokers more for their services
than other borrowers, and he hypothesizes that yield-spread premiums were at least partially respon-
sible.45 
Taking the results of Professor Jackson’s research along with findings from this paper and previous
research, we hypothesize that pricing disparities faced by African-American borrowers in the sub-
prime market are at least partially driven by YSPs. On the one hand, we have the direct evidence
from Professor Jackson and that is presented in this paper. On the other, we note that subprime
lenders’ rate sheets routinely stipulate that brokers can only maximize the amount of a YSP if the
loan carries a prepayment penalty.46 In practice, this linking of YSPs with prepayment penalties
ensures that a lender will receive either extra-interest or penalty income sufficient to offset the up-
front cash payment to a broker. Bocian and Zhai have previously shown that borrowers in commu-
nities of color were at greater risk of receiving a subprime loan with a prepayment penalty control-
ling for differences in credit quality, location, and property type.47
In addition to yield-spread premiums, non-interest up-front charges on home loans referred to as
“points and fees” can vary over wide ranges.48 Since the loan’s APR reflects some (though not all) of
these charges, variations in points and fees paid by borrowers of different races and ethnicities also
may give rise to differences in APR spreads. Interestingly, recent research using some of the same
data employed by Professor Jackson showed that borrowers paid the most when some of their bro-
kers’ compensation came from both yield-spread premiums and other up-front charges.49 This evi-
dence is consistent with brokers charging YSPs on top of, rather than in place of, other discre-
tionary up-front fees.
We hypothesize that pricing
disparities faced by African-
American borrowers in the
subprime market are at least
partially driven by YSPs. 
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2. Objective pricing criteria may be waived or modified disproportionately in favor of
white borrowers.
Lenders appear to be under considerable pressure to deviate from objective pricing in order to secure
loans originated by mortgage brokers. Accounting for an estimated 59 percent of subprime origina-
tions in 2005,50 broker-originated mortgages comprise an important market segment. Lenders must
compete against other lenders in the bid to provide loans to the large borrower base that obtain
their mortgages from brokers. Available evidence suggests that the resulting pressure does indeed
lead to exceptions to posted guidelines. 
Select results from a recent survey of 2,400 mortgage brokers published by a leading industry trade
publication suggested that the explicit discretion available to brokers in rate sheets may represent
only part of subjective changes that occur in the pricing process.51 In the survey, almost half (47 per-
cent) of respondents said they dismissed rate sheets and automated pricing systems in favor of a
phone call to determine the interest rate applicable to a loan. In addition, while the publication did
not report specific statistics, it did affirm that brokers seek exceptions to the standard underwriting
guidelines provided by lenders. 
If such exceptions are made more for one group of borrowers than another, it would clearly have the
potential to lead to disparate loan pricing between groups. This hypothesis is more than pure suppo-
sition. In closely related questions examined in matched-pair testing, Urban Institute researchers
have found that borrowers of color received less favorable treatment in the mortgage application
process.52
B. Market Segmentation
Borrowers of color also would be more likely to receive higher-rate subprime loans if they tended, on
average, to receive their loans from lenders that generally charge more than the lenders predomi-
nately serving white borrowers. Such lenders might face a greater cost of funds, have higher over-
head charges resulting from less streamlined operations, higher marketing expenses, or might simply
demand greater returns.53 While we generally expect that efficient markets will result in borrowers
selecting for themselves loan options with the lowest costs,54 substantial evidence, apart from the
findings presented in this paper, exists to support the notion that borrowers are not finding their
way to the best-priced home loan.55 This section discusses three possible explanations for this pat-
tern. 
1. Higher-cost lenders may directly or indirectly target borrowers of color.
The most obvious explanation for why borrowers of color would disproportionately receive their
loans from higher-rate lenders would be that higher-rate lenders target borrowers of color directly on
the basis of race or ethnicity or indirectly on the basis of traits correlated with race or ethnicity.
Some examples of the latter might include marketing targeted at borrowers living in certain geo-
graphic locations or who have education, wealth, unemployment rates, or other factors often associ-
ated with less financial sophistication. 
Once identified, targeted borrowers who share these traits might be disproportionately subject to
aggressive marketing techniques. In fact, William Apgar and Allegra Calder have noted that “even
though mortgage loans are now readily available in low-income minority communities, by employ-
ing high-pressure sales practices and deceptive tactics, some mortgage brokers push minority borrow-
ers into higher-cost subprime mortgages that are not well suited to their needs and can lead to
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financial problems down the road.”   This observation is
particularly troubling since it may be difficult even for an
otherwise optimal market to correct such inefficiencies.
That is, responsible lenders will be seriously challenged to
compete for business in communities of color if unscrupu-
lous lenders are using aggressive and deceptive tactics to
persuade borrowers to accept their loans.56
This sort of targeting might help explain the disparities
observed among Latino borrowers in our dataset. We
believe that the group of borrowers identified as Latino in
HMDA data is broad, ranging from recent immigrants to
fourth- or higher-generation Americans.57 It might be the
case, however, that Latinos who take a subprime mortgage
to purchase a home are more likely to be recent immigrants. If so, the higher disparities we observe
in the purchase market for Latinos may arise from the targeting of recent immigrants by higher-cost
lenders. Under such a hypothesis, recent Latino immigrants might also face disparate outcomes in
the refinance market that we are unable to capture since those results are blended with a broader
Latino population.
Similarly, even if a lender is not directly involved in such targeting, it may be that mortgage brokers
and other third parties involved in the transaction disproportionately refer borrowers to higher-cost
lenders. Why?  One explanation is that higher YSPs might motivate brokers to work with such
lenders. Even if brokers or other third parties refer borrowers to lenders in a non-discriminatory way,
if the brokers disproportionately serve borrowers of color and also disproportionately provide loans
that cost more than retail loans, then borrowers of color would tend to get higher prices. As Apgar
and Calder point out, this proposition is supported by empirical research:58 A 2001 AARP survey of
older borrowers found that 64 percent of African-American borrowers received their loan from a
broker versus just 38 percent of white borrowers.59 Also, Alexander et al. report that third-party sub-
prime originations are more likely to default and that they therefore carry a higher rate than retail-
originated loans.60
2. Relatively lower-cost subprime lenders might not compete aggressively for business in commu-
nities of color.
If brokers or other more expensive loan originators are disproportionately providing loans to borrow-
ers of color, it is fair to ask whether lower-cost lenders are under-serving such customers. In this
explanation, white borrowers receive disproportionately fewer higher-rate loans not because borrow-
ers of color are targeted for such loans, but because the latter are excluded from lower-cost subprime
loans. There is at least some anecdotal evidence that this problem continues to persist in the mar-
ketplace. For example, in 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice filed two cases against lenders for
failing to lend in communities of color.61
The most potentially troubling hypothesis along these lines would be a scenario in which different
affiliates of a lender essentially segmented their customers, with one disproportionately serving white
borrowers with lower-cost subprime loans and the other marketing higher rates to communities of
color. If this were the case, it is unclear whether the regulatory enforcement agencies have the infra-
structure and resources necessary to detect and fully investigate such patterns.62
Responsible lenders will be 
seriously challenged to compete
for business in communities of
color if unscrupulous lenders are
using aggressive and deceptive
tactics to persuade borrowers to
accept their loans.
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3. Higher-cost lenders may be more likely to flip borrowers.
A final possibility is that borrowers of color are no more likely to be served by higher-rate lenders
than white borrowers—but are more likely to receive multiple loans within one year from a higher-
rate lender. Because our dataset is comprised of loan transactions and not borrowers, we are unable
to detect instances in which borrowers take multiple first-lien loans in a year. Loan flipping, where
borrowers are repeatedly refinanced primarily for the purpose of generating income for the loan orig-
inators rather than for the benefit of the borrowers, has been identified as an important issue in the
predatory lending context.63 Recent research by Courchane, Surrette and Zorn indicates that bor-
rowers’ subsequent loans in the subprime market are explained in part by the market segment of
their current loan:  “We conclude, therefore, that previous mortgage segment is an important deter-
minant of current market segment even after controlling for risk-related underwriting and demo-
graphic effects.”64 If rapid loan flipping (i.e., multiple loans within one calendar year) is concentrat-
ed in higher-rate subprime lenders, we note that it could contribute to the disparities we observe in
refinance loans.  
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Our research shows that, for most types of subprime mortgages, borrowers of color are more likely to
receive higher-rate loans, and objective risk factors fail to explain the disparities. We have discussed
several reasons that could explain this phenomenon related, broadly, to disparate loan pricing and
the possible effects of market segmentation. It is likely that all of the factors discussed play some role
in making subprime home loans more costly than necessary for people of color. In addition, the
business practices that support excessive charges could apply equally to individual white borrowers
in the subprime market who may lack the bargaining ability or financial experience to fully protect
themselves. 
Given the importance of wealth-building to all Americans, and the current wealth gap that exists
between white Americans and communities of color,65 these pricing disparities in the subprime mar-
ket call for reform in the mortgage market. To encourage fair pricing of home loans that is based
only on legitimate risk factors and facilitates economic progress for all borrowers, we recommend the
following:  
1. Curtail steering by requiring objective pricing standards. 
Today, through advances in technology, lenders have a stronger ability than ever to apply risk-based
pricing. Increasing the fairness and objectivity of the subprime home loan origination process would
significantly improve outcomes for all families. Given the many explicit ways that American public
policy supports homeownership, it is especially important that borrowers representing equivalent
risks receive similar treatment from mortgage professionals. We believe the best way to reach this
end is to eliminate discretionary pricing in the subprime loan market, prompting lenders to adopt
transparent, market-driven prices for mortgages representing similar risks. 
Eliminating discretionary pricing in the subprime loan market would not necessarily mean eliminat-
ing yield-spread premiums. We believe homeowners should retain the right to pay for home loans
through a variety of mechanisms, including yield-spread premiums when they truly benefit borrow-
ers.66 A number of sound options exist for achieving more rational pricing in the subprime market
while still permitting broker compensation through YSPs where appropriate:
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• Include YSPs in laws designed to protect homeowners from abusive lending practices. The
Federal Reserve has the discretion to include YSPs in the calculation whether or not a loan is high-
cost under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA),67 and therefore eligible for
special protections. Given the prevalence of YSPs in documented cases of predatory lending,68 it
makes no sense to ignore these fees in a law specifically designed to protect borrowers from predato-
ry lending. This is a glaring loophole that affects all subprime loans originated by mortgage brokers,
well over half the market.
• Prohibit the combination of YSPs and prepayment penalties in the same subprime home loan.
Prepayment penalties and YSPs work together in ways that are contrary to borrowers’ interests: prepay-
ment penalties allow lenders to lock in an above-market yield, making them more willing to pay inflated
YSPs to brokers for over-priced loans. We believe that’s why our previous research revealed the counterin-
tuitive result that borrowers with subprime loans that include prepayment penalties fail to receive lower
interest rates than similarly-situated borrowers without prepayment penalties.69 With prepayment penalties
attached to overpriced loans, lenders benefit either way—they get paid either through payment of penal-
ties at early payoff or through the higher-than-necessary interest paid out over time. Without the prepay-
ment penalty, borrowers who realize they paid too much for their mortgage could quickly refinance into a
lower-cost loan, and, as the lender understands, has every incentive to do so. 
The combination of YSPs and prepayment penalties also creates opportunities for deceptive marketing.
Prepayment penalties are commonly justified as an option by which borrowers may lower the interest rate,
while YSPs are commonly justified as an option offered to exchange a higher interest rate for reduced clos-
ing costs. Given the link between higher YSPs and prepayment penalties, the YSP may in fact counter the
benefits borrowers supposedly receive from prepayment penalties. The net result, indeed, may be that a
borrower pays twice for little or no benefit.70 Even if either a YSP or a prepayment penalty had a benefit to
the borrower, the combination of the two in a subprime loan creates a serious impediment to informed
borrower choice, and may be an indicator of potential abuse.71
•  Improve transparency of YSPs by requiring checks for YSPs to be written jointly to borrowers and
brokers. Currently, borrowers see YSPs as a cryptic entry on a closing form—if they see the charge at all. A
joint-payee provision would mean that brokers could not cash a check without a borrower’s endorsement,
helping to ensure the borrower has full knowledge of the broker’s compensation. 
In general, reining in discretionary pricing in the subprime market would simplify an incredibly complicat-
ed mortgage process, remove an opportunity to discriminate against unsuspecting borrowers, and promote
competition. 
2. Follow the lead of the securities industry and hold lenders and brokers responsible for provid-
ing loans that are suitable for a given borrower.
Investment professionals have long had an affirmative duty to ensure that the products they recom-
mend are suitable for their customers. Buying a home is the biggest investment that most families
ever make, and, since the home’s equity is the major source of wealth for most families, refinancing
is an investment decision of more relevance to most families than stock purchases. Arguably today’s
mortgage transactions are at least  as complicated as financial decisions made with investment pro-
fessionals, yet families do not have a similar assurance that their lender or broker will deal fairly
with them by offering them loans that are suitable given their needs and circumstances. A securities
broker who steers a borrower into an inappropriate investment risks punishment; a mortgage broker
who does the same may reap higher compensation with no negative consequences. To protect home-
buyers and homeowners, lenders and brokers should be required to recommend loans that are suit-
able and reasonably advantageous for borrowers.72
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Mortgage brokers, in particular, should have a fiduciary duty to borrowers to use best efforts to
obtain the best available loan for the borrower. Brokers now originate nearly 60 percent of subprime
mortgages.73 Borrowers expect their brokers to represent their best interests, and brokers should be
held to that standard. The stakes are too high to allow misplaced incentives to harm families’
chances of paying a fair price for their home and building their net worth. 
3. Discourage pricing discrimination by requiring subprime lenders to disclose more detailed
pricing and underwriting information in their HMDA data.
The collection of APR information, as described in this report, is a positive first step in assessing
pricing information, but it is of only limited value without a full disclosure of points and fees on sub-
prime mortgages, including up-front fees, yield-spread premiums, and prepayment penalties. Not all
up-front fees are captured in the APR. Further, in most cases, the APR understates the true costs of
even those fees it captures because it amortizes them over the term of the loan, typically fifteen or
thirty years. In fact, the vast majority of subprime home loans are paid off within the first two-to-
five years. As a result, although two loans might have the same APR, a loan with high up-front fees
typically costs borrowers much more. Information on points and fees would allow for a more accu-
rate analysis of what families pay for their home loans.
In addition, as this research shows, HMDA data currently lacks information that would be helpful in
evaluating how lenders serve their markets. HMDA should be modified to include the disclosure of
factors such as loan-to-value ratios and credit scores of borrowers. In addition, HMDA should
include the origination channel for each loan, so that researchers could better assess pricing differ-
ences or similarities among broker, correspondent and retail originations. Working in good faith,
interested parties can produce a workable mechanism for providing critical information without
unduly compromising privacy.74 
4. Ensure regulators have adequate resources and authority, and are held accountable, for fully
enforcing fair lending laws.
Fair lending violations are serious concerns. One of the main goals of HMDA is to help identify
potential discriminatory lending patterns and to enforce anti-discrimination laws. Last year, based
on the raw disparities evident in the 2004 HMDA data, the Fed referred some 200 lenders to federal
and state regulators for further investigation. These 200 lenders accounted for 48 percent of owner-
occupied loans reported under HMDA in 2004.75 To date, no information about the outcome of
those referrals has been made public. In the meantime, lenders already have submitted 2005 HMDA
data to their federal regulators and early reports suggest that disparities have increased since 2004.76
It is important that regulators review and act on the information available to them in a timely and
transparent fashion. Whether or not the regulators find that lenders have violated applicable laws,
borrowers and the larger public need to know that the investigation process is fair and effective. To
this end, we recommend that each regulator report annually on the number of fair lending examina-
tions performed and for each examination provide publicly-available information, including: (1) the
indicators of potential discriminatory activity identified (if any); (2) the protected class or classes
(e.g., gender, race) believed to be potentially disadvantaged by such activity; and (3) the outcome of
each review (i.e., any actions taken).
In addition, turf battles should not impede efforts to protect borrowers. In the wake of the release of
the 2004 HMDA data, at least one federal regulator has put significant energy into a court action to
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prevent a state attorney general from having access to information necessary to evaluate potentially
discriminatory practices by lending institutions.77 We wish it were clear that the same energy has
been put into getting to the root of racial and ethnic disparities in home lending. It will take con-
certed efforts from all interested parties to ensure that similarly-situated families receive fairly-priced
loans.
5. Create incentives and support a policy framework that leads the market to better serve com-
munities of color.
Some of the key goals of HMDA include determining whether financial institutions are serving the
housing needs of their communities and helping public officials to make public investments in a way
that attracts private investment in areas that need it. Over time, it has become clear that not all
credit is good credit. As discussed above, one reason African-American and Hispanic families are
more likely to receive higher-rate loans may be that they tend to receive loans from lenders that
generally charge more. Policymakers should review whether lower-cost lenders need additional
incentives to help meet the credit needs of communities of color. Conversely, regulatory enforcers of
fair lending laws should actively evaluate whether the higher-cost lenders “reverse red-line” by tar-
geting communities of color for high-priced products unrelated to individual borrower risk. 
When unscrupulous lending practices go unchecked, borrowers are not the only ones who suffer
harm; lower-cost lenders and honest brokers also are placed at a disadvantage. They cannot compete
with lenders or brokers who make loans on unfair or deceptive terms or who push-market loans that
are not in a borrower’s best interest. Laws and regulations that prohibit predatory, irresponsible sub-
prime lending have proven effective in reducing the number of abusive loans while maintaining a
vibrant market for subprime home loans. 
A recent study by the Center for Responsible Lending showed that lenders have responded to strong
state laws not by reducing the availability of subprime loans, but rather by making subprime home
loans that do not contain the terms targeted by the laws.78 Furthermore, the interest rates on sub-
prime home loans were about the same or even lower than the rates in states that did not target
those abusive loan terms.79 Policymakers should endorse legislation that builds on the proven meth-
ods for protecting families from abusive lending while retaining access to subprime credit.
Recognizing that new abuses continue to emerge, such laws should ensure that all those responsible
for representing and protecting families have authority to act to address new problems. 
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APPENDIX 1: Credit Research Center Study
The Federal Reserve’s report on 2004 HMDA data included research conducted by the Credit
Research Center (CRC). In their analysis of loan data, the CRC found almost no disparities in the
proportions of borrowers receiving higher-rate loans by race or ethnicity, after making adjustments
for risk factors such as LTV and FICO scores. These findings have been erroneously cited to support
the proposition that risk factors fully explain pricing disparities in the subprime market.80 Even with-
out considering the contradictory evidence presented in this paper, there are two reasons to be skep-
tical of this claim:
1. The data used in the CRC analysis does not appear to be representative of the 
subprime market. 
CRC’s analysis relied on 2004 HMDA data from eight unidentified subprime lenders, supplemented
by proprietary information provided by those lenders. No information is provided on how these
lenders were chosen nor whether they were representative of the subprime market as a whole. In
fact, there is evidence that the composition of loans from these lenders is fundamentally different
from that of the overall subprime market. For example, over 80 percent of both the purchase loans
and refinance loans analyzed by CRC were higher-rate. However, CRL estimates that less than 50
percent of subprime lending falls into this category.81 Since the data appears to be fairly non-repre-
sentative of the subprime market, it is difficult to believe that the findings should be generalized to
describe that market.
2. The methodology used in the CRC analysis is unclear and appears to be specified in a way
that would limit disparities arising from brokered transactions.
The Fed’s report does not contain important information on CRC’s methodology, and it does not
provide results for the control variables that were used in the analysis. This lack of clarity makes it
difficult to understand the context for CRC’s results and, consequently, what conclusions one can
reasonably draw. Also of importance, CRC controlled for whether the loan was originated by a bro-
ker. This may be useful for isolating the impact of race and ethnicity on loan pricing on the one
hand from the impact of the type of originator on the other. However, we believe that broker partic-
ipation in loans itself is a potential source of disparities through discretionary up-selling by use of
yield-spread premiums. The CRC’s inclusion of the broker category as a control variable entirely
ignores the effect that the broker plays in pricing loans to African-Americans or Latinos in a 
manner unrelated to risk, and therefore makes it impossible to assess whether these borrowers
receive higher-cost mortgages than white borrowers unrelated to commonly-accepted risk factors. 
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APPENDIX 2: Matching HMDA Data with Another Database
We chose a conservative methodology to match HMDA reports and loans in the proprietary 
database in order to minimize the potential number of “bad matches.”  That is, we were willing to
settle for a smaller number of loan matches in order to be confident that we were correctly matching 
specific loans. Below is a table outlining our matching process.
Step 1: Select HMDA Loans: We first selected 2004 home purchase or
refinance loan originations secured by owner-occupied, 1- to 4-unit or
manufactured housing from selected HMDA lenders82
Step 2: Add Zip Code to HMDA: Next, we identified a dataset that pro-
vides a list of every census tract/zip code combination for the entire
U.S. That is, for every census tract, there is a separate observation for
every zip code that overlaps that tract. We merged our HMDA loans
from step 1 with this census tract/zip code dataset
Step 3: Remove Non-Unique Loans: In step 3, we identified and
removed HMDA loans that did not have unique combinations of the
variables that were common to both datasets, namely lender name,
state, zip code, loan purpose, property type, lien status, and loan
amount. 
Step 4: Remove Overlapping Census Codes: To ensure that we had the
right zip code for all of the loans in our analysis, in step 4 we deleted
all loans that were not in census tracts that are completely encom-
passed within a single zip code.
Step 5: Select Loans: We then selected home purchase or 
refinance loans secured by owner-occupied 1-4 unit or manufactured
housing originated in 2004 from the proprietary database.83
Step 6: Remove Non-Unique Loans: Next, we identified and removed
loans from the proprietary database that did not have unique combina-
tions of the following variables: i.e. state, zip code, loan purpose,
property type, lien status, and loan amount.84 Keep only loans from
lenders in this dataset with more than 1,000 observations.
Step 7. Merge HMDA and proprietary database sub-datasets: Finally, we
merged the sub-datasets created in steps 4 and 6 by lender,85 state,
zip code, loan purpose, property type, lien status and loan amount.
We kept only those loans that appeared in both datasets.
5,337,495 unique loan records
12,421,598 representing the
5,337,495 HMDA loans (there are
multiple observations for loans with
census tracts that overlap more than
one zip code)
9,292,170 (there are still multiple
observations for loan with census
tracts that overlap zip codes)
1,968,148 unique HMDA loan records
535,030 unique loan records from
the proprietary database (includes
loans in all census tracts, not just
those fully encompassed in single
zip codes)
177,487 unique loan records in
merged datasets
Process Observations 
1,842,228 unique loan records from
proprietary database
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Using the 535,030 loans from the proprietary database that we tried to merge with HMDA as the
denominator, we achieved a match rate of 33 percent. Since many of the loans in the proprietary
database that we tried to match may have been removed from the HMDA loans eligible for match-
ing due to “non-unique characteristics,” this match rate seemed reasonable.
To check the validity of our matches, we selected a random sample of loans from the merged
dataset. We searched for these loans in a third database called Leads-To-Loans.86 We used data from
the proprietary database to set the parameters in the following Leads-To-Loans search fields: origina-
tion date, origination amount, loan type, loan purpose, zip code and lender. Small ranges were used
in the origination amount and date parameters, to account for slight variations in rounding or date
entry. Loan information such as census tract and gender of borrower/co-borrower were then com-
pared to comparable HMDA fields. Due to the limitations in Leads-To-Loans coverage, many of the
loans that we randomly generated could not be found in Leads-To-Loans but, of the first 100 that
were found, 93 were confirmed as matches.
APPENDIX 3: Comparison of Proprietary Database and Merged Dataset Mean Values by Loan Product
Table A.1  All Owner-Occupied Purchase Loans
Variable All 2004 Loans in Proprietary Database Merged Dataset Mean
(n = 725,262) (n = 75,764)
FICO 663.7 652.6
LTV 86.3 87.0
TERM 340.6 341.0
ORIGINATION AMOUNT 181,252 191,792
INITIAL RATE 7.2 7.5
LOW/NO DOC STATUS (%) 46.4 44.0
PREPAYMENT PENALTY (%) 61.8 65.6
CENTRAL CITY (%) 33.3 33.4
OUTSIDE CENTRAL CITY (%) 58.4 58.2
RURAL (%) 8.3 8.4
Table A.2. All Owner-Occupied Refinance Loans
Variable All 2004 Loans in Proprietary Database Merged Dataset Mean
(n = 1,116,966) (n = 101,723)
FICO 620.8 612.7
LTV 78.1 77.2
TERM 343.0 345.9 
ORIGINATION AMOUNT 185,912 199,923
INITIAL RATE 7.1 7.3
LOW/NO DOC STATUS (%) 34.4 33.7
PREPAYMENT PENALTY (%) 66.3 68.0
CENTRAL CITY (%) 30.4 30.0
OUTSIDE CENTRAL CITY (%) 59.1 59.7
RURAL (%) 10.5 10.5
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APPENDIX 4: The Expanded Models: Three-Stage, Least-Squares Model Specifications
Using our merged dataset, we employed logistical regressions to estimate the impact of race and eth-
nicity on the likelihood of a borrower receiving a “higher-rate” loan, that is, a loan that exceeds
HMDA’s APR spread reporting threshold.87 Our “expanded” models (Models 2 and 3) correct for
possible interdependence (or “endogeneity”) between APR spread and several independent vari-
ables, namely LTV, origination amount, and prepayment penalties. As mentioned in the text of the
report, the methodology and models are largely based on those used by Brent Ambrose, Michael
LaCour-Little and Anthony Sanders, though modifications were made based on the availability of
data and to reflect the different objectives of our analysis.88 
To correct for possible the endogeneity of LTV and origination amount, which are continuous vari-
ables, with APR spread, we ran a Three-Stage, Least-Squares (3SLS) analysis: 
1. First Stage: In the first stage, LTV and origination amount were each estimated using ordinary
least squares regressions with the following independent variables, or “instruments”: black, Latino,
FICO, monthly_income, monthly_income2,  refi,  credit_spread, yield_curve, hpi_vol, rate_vol, hpi,
subprime_rate,89 prepay, full_doc, cdiv2-cdiv9, statelaw2-statelaw9, qtr2-qtr4, condo, n_ccity, rural,
black_state, Latino_state, agency2-agency5. The estimations from these two regressions led to two
new variables for each loan: LTV_instrumented and Orig_Amt_instrumented.
2. Second Stage: In the second stage, the actual LTV and origination amount variables were simul-
taneously estimated, using the following equations:
(A) ORIG_AMT = black Latino LTV_instrumented sub_rate monthly_income
monthly_income2 HPI full_doc
(B)  LTV = black Latino ORIG_AMT_instrumented FICO sub_rate monthly_income month-
ly_income2 HPI full_doc
3. Third Stage: In the third stage, the two equations in the second stage were automatically re-esti-
mated, correcting for correlations between their error terms.
In the final logistic regression model we used the estimated LTV and origination amount variables
from the third stage of the three-stage least squares regression instead of the actual LTVs and origi-
nation amounts. All other independent variables are identical to those in the base model. Using the
estimated LTV and origination amount variables, rather than the actual values, avoids problems that
would occur if these LTV and origination amount were, in fact, jointly-determined or “endogenous”
with the APR of the loan.
Data Stratification for Binary Variable Prepayment Penalty
To correct for the potential endogeneity between APR spread and the existence of prepayment
penalties (which is a binary variable), we ran the above expanded model specification separately for
loans with and without prepayment penalties.90 Specifically, Model 2 ran the model on loans with-
out prepayment penalties and Model 3 ran the identical model on loans with prepayment penalties. 
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Variations on Methodology
To test the robustness of our model specification, we tried a few variations on our base model.
Variations fell into three categories: 
1. Less rigid restrictions on included loans: In one set of variations, we relaxed the criteria by which
we included the matched data into our analysis dataset. Specifically, we allowed all matched loans to
be included, regardless of whether the census tract was completely encompassed within a single zip
code or overlapped multiple zip codes. This variation essentially doubled our sample size but slightly
increased the chances that there would be “false” matches.
2. Changes in included independent variables: We also tried altering our model by modifying the
independent variables that we included in the analysis. In one set, we removed the three state law
dummy variables and replaced them with 49 state dummy variables. In another set, we added an
interaction variable between FICO and LTV.
3. Altered functional form: Finally, we altered the functional form of two independent variables,
using the logarithmic rather than the natural forms of LTV and origination amount. 
Importantly, none of these variations altered the basic findings of our analysis. That is, estimates of
the impact of race and ethnicity on the odds of receiving a higher-rate loan were largely consistent
with our principal analysis. 
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APPENDIX 5: The Limitations of APR
While information on the APR spread is essential to understanding patterns of loan pricing, it is not
sufficient. Without discrete information on the points, fees, and interest rates associated with loans,
it is impossible to fully evaluate the actual cost of credit to the average borrower. 
Consider two 30-year loans: Loan A carries a note rate of 10 percent and has no points or fees; Loan
B carries a note rate of 9 percent but has financed fees equal to 10 percent of the loan principal.
Both of these loans have APRs roughly equal to 10 percent (10.0 percent for loan A versus 10.1 per-
cent for loan B), but the actual cost of the loans would likely be very different since a typical sub-
prime loan might remain outstanding for only two years. In fact, if both loans are repaid at the 24th
month, the Loan B, high-fee, borrower will have paid a total of $29,668 in interest and fees versus
just $19,891 for the Loan A, no fee borrower. In other words, the Loan B borrower will pay 49 per-
cent more than the Loan A borrower, despite having almost the same APR. This counterintuitive
result is produced because APR assumes that points and fees are spread out and repaid over the full
loan term. 
The fact that APR hides the size of fees for most borrowers is not merely of academic concern. Since
the rate spread between APR and Treasury securities is the only price information that lenders are
required to report under HMDA, there is an incentive for lenders to shift some of their compensa-
tion from rates to fees, since they can obtain much greater compensation without changing the
APR. This result is exactly the opposite of what responsible lending principles would dictate. Loan
pricing is the most important issue in understanding the fairness of the mortgage market, and it is
essential that the loan pricing information collected provide an accurate and complete picture of the
cost of credit. Although abusive lending is often thought to be associated with high interest rates,
the primary issue is high fees charged to borrowers.
Because of incentives to rely on fees for compensation, it is important that lenders be held account-
able for charging fees that are fair and equitable. As noted in the policy recommendations of our
report, we strongly urge the Federal Reserve to include mortgage fee information in the data collect-
ed under HMDA.
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Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value
INTERCEPT 7.2747 2.3130 0.0017 7.7156 6.6300 0.2445 6.2408   2.7267 0.0221
BLACK 0.5378 0.1393 0.0001 0.4919 0.2578 0.0564 0.6078   0.1744 0.0005
HISPANIC 0.4675 0.1434 0.0011 1.0599 0.3279 0.0012 0.5361   0.1664 0.0013
MONTHLY INCOME 0.000013 0.000015 0.4029 0.000714 0.000088 <.0001 0.000049   0.000020 0.0143
LTV 0.0973 0.00548 <.0001 0.0905 0.0430 0.0355 0.1013   0.00846 <.0001
FICO -0.0257 0.00114 <.0001 -0.0234 0.00226 <.0001 -0.0239   0.00143 <.0001
ORIG_AMT -0.00001 1.092E-6 <.0001 -0.00007 6.874E-6 <.0001 -0.00002   1.871E-6 <.0001
CREDIT_SPREAD 1.2211 2.1943 0.5779 0.1043 4.2675 0.9805 2.2961   2.6639 0.3887
YIELD_CURVE 0.6371 0.6708 0.3423 1.1143 1.3226 0.3995 0.5051   0.7970 0.5263
HPI_VOL 0.0106 0.0103 0.3037 0.0988 0.0243 <.0001 0.0339   0.0142 0.0170
RATE_VOL 3.4599 3.0742 0.2604 8.5546 5.9516 0.1506 2.0903   3.7311 0.5753
CDIV2 0.0751 0.2866 0.7932 0.1996 0.6436 0.7565 -0.0295   0.3756 0.9374
CDIV3 0.1270 0.3274 0.6981 -0.7542 0.7577 0.3196 0.3642   0.4201 0.3860
CDIV4 0.2396 0.3564 0.5014 -0.0403 0.7453 0.9568 -0.2470   0.4938 0.6170
CDIV5 -0.1123 0.3219 0.7273 -1.5140 0.8702 0.0819 -0.0987   0.3777 0.7938
CDIV6 -0.3128 0.3923 0.4252 -1.6956 1.0246 0.0979 -0.2250   0.4862 0.6435
CDIV7 0.2936 0.4260 0.4907 -2.9589 1.0777 0.0060 0.5705   0.5572 0.3059
CDIV8 -0.1582 0.3791 0.6765 -1.1203 1.1593 0.3339 -0.2941   0.4496 0.5131
CDIV9 -0.5227 0.3302 0.1135 -0.9371 0.7636 0.2198 -0.6083   0.4102 0.1381
STATELAW2* -0.1989 0.2090 0.3413 0.5323 0.3742 0.1549 -0.5116   0.3142 0.1035
STATELAW3* -0.3619 0.1688 0.0320 -0.5712 0.2994 0.0564 -0.5702   0.2369 0.0161
STATELAW4* -0.6954 0.3410 0.0414 -0.8977 0.8857 0.3108 -0.8500   0.4194 0.0427
CONDO -0.0642 0.1888 0.7338 -0.3173 0.3639 0.3832 -0.0123   0.2375 0.9588
MULTI 0.4119 0.2282 0.0711 0.4756 0.3472 0.1708 0.2431   0.3059 0.4268
N_CCITY -0.0956 0.1128 0.3970 -0.5587 0.2446 0.0223 0.0570   0.1326 0.6674
RURAL 0.3171 0.1535 0.0389 0.4609 0.2782 0.0976 0.2733   0.1916 0.1539
FULL_DOC -1.2570 0.1218 <.0001 -1.4716 0.2660 <.0001 -1.4544   0.1503 <.0001
PREPAY 0.1595 0.1274 0.2106 NA NA NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE 0.0268 0.0114 0.0185 0.0767 0.0256 0.0027 0.0187   0.0151 0.2137
HISPANIC_STATE -0.0164 0.00762 0.0309 0.00565 0.0203 0.7811 -0.0198   0.00991 0.0453
AGENCY_CODE1** -0.2057 0.1410 0.1447 -0.8857 0.2501 0.0004 0.6608   0.1904 0.0005
AGENCY_CODE2** -0.3757 0.2818 0.1825 -0.2665 0.5122 0.6029 -0.1138   0.3391 0.7372
AGENCY_CODE3** 0.3726 0.2296 0.1047 0.7211 0.4529 0.1114 0.4145   0.2703 0.1252
AGENCY_CODE4** 0.4420 0.4692 0.3462 0.2114 0.9763 0.8286 0.6225   0.5634 0.2692
Q2 -1.0418 0.2134 <.0001 -0.8919 0.4047 0.0275 -1.0755   0.2560 <.0001
Q3 -0.3995 0.3964 0.3136 -0.8245 0.7662 0.2819 -0.2711   0.4780 0.5706
Q4 -0.0828 0.6104 0.8921 -1.1322 1.1487 0.3243 0.1919   0.7493 0.7979
Summary Statistics
Number of Lenders 34 31 29
Number of 
Observations 3679 1444 2235
System R-Squared
(3SLS Only) NA 0.4522 0.4654
Nagelkerke R-Squared 0.6150 0.6821 0.5748
Cox-Snell R-Squared 0.4480 0.4661 0.4273
KS Statistic91 (all) 66.68 76.90 62.47
KS Statistic (Black=1) 60.15 58.71 62.63
KS Statistic 
(Hispanic=1) 66.59 73.26 64.11
KS Statistic 
(Black=0, Hispanic=0) 67.24 80.42 60.93
APPENDIX 6: Model Estimates and Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: 1 if APR_Spread Exceeds HMDA Reporting Threshold; 0 otherwise.
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables
Table A.3. 30-Year Fixed-Rate Purchase Loans
Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
3-Year Prepayment Penalties
Center for Responsible Lending        35
Table A.4. Descriptive Statistics for Table A.3 Analyses
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
HMDA_THRESHOLD 0.3571623 0.4792283 0.2617729 0.4397519 0.4187919 0.4934716
BLACK 0.1592824 0.3659890 0.1551247 0.3621489 0.1619687 0.3685045
HISPANIC 0.1777657 0.3823674 0.1239612 0.3296515 0.2125280 0.4091879
MONTHLY INCOME 5320.20 3989.15 5704.64 3689.36 5071.81 4153.32
LTV 83.1778391 11.7312862 82.1244598 10.7256256 83.8584116 12.2919362
FICO 659.5216091 68.7125013 687.5948753 71.3951747 641.3838926 60.3506785
ORIG_AMT 132112.62 73693.26 138620.21 76339.48 127908.16 71635.35
CREDIT_SPREAD 0.7607774 0.0470407 0.7580956 0.0482189 0.7625101 0.0461917
YIELD_CURVE 2.4402800 0.4311356 2.3756163 0.4511046 2.4820582 0.4124714
HPI_VOL 13.5382162 10.2578874 14.0250821 10.0373188 13.2236595 10.3880042
RATE_VOL 0.2311453 0.1253267 0.2477549 0.1299524 0.2204140 0.1210684
CDIV2 0.1195977 0.3245346 0.1738227 0.3790882 0.0845638 0.2782937
CDIV3 0.1361783 0.3430244 0.1675900 0.3736312 0.1158837 0.3201570
CDIV4 0.0554499 0.2288873 0.0983380 0.2978742 0.0277405 0.1642651
CDIV5 0.1891818 0.3917062 0.2590028 0.4382389 0.1440716 0.3512409
CDIV6 0.0470236 0.2117182 0.0325485 0.1775131 0.0563758 0.2306977
CDIV7 0.1889100 0.3914903 0.0858726 0.2802729 0.2554810 0.4362288 
CDIV8 0.0603425 0.2381527 0.0526316 0.2233742 0.0653244 0.2471527
CDIV9 0.1427018 0.3498161 0.0796399 0.2708287 0.1834452 0.3871177
STATELAW2* 0.3549878 0.4785747 0.2409972 0.4278368 0.4286353 0.4949916
STATELAW3* 0.3547160 0.4784922 0.3871191 0.4872600 0.3337808 0.4716680
STATELAW4* 0.0350639 0.1839663 0.0311634 0.1738194 0.0375839 0.1902302
CONDO 0.1002990 0.3004391 0.1170360 0.3215746 0.0894855 0.2855071
MULTI 0.0524599 0.2229829 0.0630194 0.2430820 0.0456376 0.2087446
N_CCITY 0.4514814 0.4977080 0.4736842 0.4994800 0.4371365 0.4961434
RURAL 0.1527589 0.3598038 0.1731302 0.3784909 0.1395973 0.3466463
FULL_DOC 0.7088883 0.4543367 0.6952909 0.4604436 0.7176734 0.4502322
PREPAY 0.6075020 0.4883730 NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE 11.9206578 7.8753342 13.4023546 8.5182927 10.9633557 7.2735417
HISPANIC_STATE 13.2127752 11.9050320 10.5168283 10.3609508 14.9545861 12.5006922
AGENCY_CODE1** 0.3234575 0.4678592 0.6038781 0.4892598 0.1422819 0.3494172
AGENCY_CODE2** 0.0277249 0.1642059 0.0221607 0.1472569 0.0313199 0.1742198
AGENCY_CODE3** 0.0456646 0.2087850 0.0332410 0.1793274 0.0536913 0.2254579
AGENCY_CODE4** 0.0097853 0.0984487 0.0062327 0.0787282 0.0120805 0.1092700
Q2 0.3574341 0.4793093 0.3247922 0.4684594 0.3785235 0.4851276
Q3 0.2962762 0.4566763 0.2915512 0.4546342 0.2993289 0.4580666
Q4 0.1788529 0.3832812 0.2257618 0.4182278 0.1485459 0.3557198
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LOANS INCLUDED: 30-Year Fixed-Rate Purchase Loans
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
3-Year Prepayment Penalties
Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages36
Table A.5. 2/28 Adjustable-Rate Purchase Loans
Dependent Variable: 1 if APR_Spread Exceeds HMDA Reporting Threshold; 0 otherwise.
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables
Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value
INTERCEPT 10.0637 0.9600  <.0001 4.5718 2.2035 0.0380 9.4497 1.1802 <.0001
BLACK 0.2184 0.0545  <.0001 0.3344 0.1032 0.0012 0.3400 0.0666 <.0001
HISPANIC 0.0592 0.0529  0.2632 0.4173 0.1174 0.0004 0.5075 0.0637 <.0001
MONTHLY INCOME 0.000010 6.701E-6  0.1322 0.000253 0.000029 <.0001 0.000341 0.000019 <.0001
LTV 0.0954 0.00264  <.0001 0.1713 0.0186 <.0001 0.1250 0.00704 <.0001
FICO -0.0198 0.000450  <.0001 -0.0173 0.00101 <.0001 -0.0197 0.000596 <.0001
ORIG_AMT -0.00001 3.868E-7  <.0001 -0.00003 2.385E-6 <.0001 -0.00004 1.278E-6 <.0001
CREDIT_SPREAD -4.6146 0.8896  <.0001 -3.4968 1.6435 0.0334 -5.1180 1.0552 <.0001
YIELD_CURVE -0.4503 0.2741  0.1004 -0.6806 0.5271 0.1966 -0.3402 0.3199 0.2876
HPI_VOL 0.0125 0.00407  0.0022 0.0581 0.01000 <.0001 0.0570 0.00524 <.0001
RATE_VOL 6.9312 1.2519  <.0001 5.7033 2.3425 0.0149 7.4766 1.4789 <.0001
CDIV2 0.1567 0.0984  0.1111 -0.2896 0.2311 0.2102 -0.1611 0.1505 0.2845
CDIV3 0.3828 0.1140  0.0008 -0.3992 0.3165 0.2072 -0.0549 0.1374 0.6893
CDIV4 0.6123 0.1239  <.0001 -0.0276 0.3064 0.9282 -0.5489 0.1560 0.0004
CDIV5 0.0965 0.1165  0.4074 -0.0727 0.3750 0.8462 -0.6686 0.1315 <.0001
CDIV6 0.1045 0.1530  0.4946 -0.7111 0.4851 0.1427 -0.7180 0.1754 <.0001
CDIV7 0.8475 0.1863  <.0001 -0.2746 0.5652 0.6271 -0.4771 0.2280 0.0364
CDIV8 0.1630 0.1402  0.2447 -0.6998 0.4803 0.1451 -0.8667 0.1667 <.0001
CDIV9 -0.0857 0.1235  0.4879 -0.1901 0.3069 0.5356 -1.1120 0.1522 <.0001
STATELAW2* -0.1685 0.0849  0.0471 -0.7476 0.1712 <.0001 0.0826 0.1125 0.4631
STATELAW3* -0.0411 0.0593  0.4884 -0.1405 0.1135 0.2157 -0.4484 0.0816 <.0001
STATELAW4* -0.4508 0.1269  0.0004 -0.4470 0.2462 0.0694 -0.6028 0.1923 0.0017
CONDO -0.0760 0.0659  0.2487 -0.1318 0.1235 0.2856 -0.0216 0.0778 0.7809
MULTI 0.4716 0.0830  <.0001 0.3591 0.1250 0.0041 0.5669 0.1115 <.0001
N_CCITY -0.1470 0.0448  0.0010 -0.0853 0.0921 0.3541 -0.1407 0.0514 0.0062
RURAL 0.1509 0.0694  0.0296 0.1060 0.1335 0.4273 0.1642 0.0809 0.0424
FULL_DOC -1.3165 0.0476  <.0001 -1.8540 0.1053 <.0001 -1.5877 0.0608 <.0001
PREPAY -0.2295 0.0539  <.0001 NA NA NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE 0.00567 0.00461  0.2190 -0.0146 0.0124 0.2376 0.00967 0.00600 0.1074
HISPANIC_STATE -0.0144 0.00348  <.0001 0.00595 0.00936 0.5251 -0.0205 0.00429 <.0001
AGENCY_CODE1** 0.1873 0.0774  0.0156 0.2146 0.1709 0.2093 0.3614 0.0877 <.0001
AGENCY_CODE2** 1.4713 0.1707  <.0001 1.9051 0.2958 <.0001 1.3998 0.2063 <.0001
AGENCY_CODE3** 3.9680 0.1027  <.0001 4.1063 0.3032 <.0001 3.9572 0.1114 <.0001
AGENCY_CODE4** -3.5262 0.2976  <.0001 -3.4359 0.7603 <.0001 -3.4687 0.3232 <.0001
Q2 -1.0721 0.0857  <.0001 -0.9739 0.1601 <.0001 -1.0746 0.1010 <.0001
Q3 -1.2467 0.1588  <.0001 -1.2600 0.2933 <.0001 -1.1533 0.1885 <.0001
Q4 -1.4299 0.2356  <.0001 -1.5617 0.4299 0.0003 -1.5209 0.2804 <.0001
Summary Statistics
Number of Lenders 35 33 32
Number of 
Observations 17978 4657 13321
System R-Squared
(3SLS Only) NA 0.3273 0.4162
Nagelkerke R-Squared 0.5247 0.4484 0.5393
Cox-Snell R-Squared 0.3932 0.3358 0.4042
KS Statistic (all) 58.52 54.30 59.63
KS Statistic 
(Black=1) 59.88 57.64 60.84
KS Statistic 
(Hispanic=1) 57.00 51.88 58.68
KS Statistic 
(Black=0, Hispanic=0) 57.97 53.51 59.15
Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
2-Year Prepayment Penalties
Center for Responsible Lending        37
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
HMDA_THRESHOLD 0.5238625 0.4994441 0.5323169 0.4990081 0.5209068 0.4995815
BLACK 0.2020247 0.4015217 0.2447928 0.4300104 0.1870730 0.3899848
HISPANIC 0.2364557 0.4249170 0.2061413 0.4045766 0.2470535 0.4313143
MONTHLY INCOME 5343.82 3514.17 5810.80 4215.86 5180.56 3217.36
LTV 85.1187657 9.0612566 84.8905025 9.2225980 85.1985662 9.0031550
FICO 626.4640116 56.2751246 630.4109942 58.6704740 625.0841528 55.3491950
ORIG_AMT 148115.69 75359.67 159016.83 80526.92 144304.67 73088.10
CREDIT_SPREAD 0.7636333 0.0474368 0.7610436 0.0483879 0.7645387 0.0470679
YIELD_CURVE 2.3808088 0.4306069 2.3530170 0.4432163 2.3905247 0.4256998
HPI_VOL 16.2474764 11.3368526 18.0448063 10.8214964 15.6191328 11.4455784
RATE_VOL 0.2509125 0.1248711 0.2583326 0.1271226 0.2483185 0.1239745
CDIV2 0.1185338 0.3232481 0.3231694 0.4677370 0.0469935 0.2116328
CDIV3 0.1698743 0.3755328 0.2370625 0.4253266 0.1463854 0.3535054
CDIV4 0.0574035 0.2326184 0.0609835 0.2393257 0.0561519 0.2302235
CDIV5 0.1742686 0.3793508 0.2001288 0.4001396 0.1652278 0.3714000
CDIV6 0.0366559 0.1879208 0.0141722 0.1182132 0.0445162 0.2062467
CDIV7 0.1087440 0.3113264 0.0092334 0.0956563 0.1435328 0.3506285
CDIV8 0.0793192 0.2702438 0.0380073 0.1912344 0.0937617 0.2915079
CDIV9 0.1464568 0.3535734 0.0429461 0.2027574 0.1826439 0.3863888
STATELAW2* 0.3020358 0.4591535 0.1477346 0.3548748 0.3559793 0.4788269
STATELAW3* 0.3487040 0.4765733 0.4584496 0.4983241 0.3103371 0.4626489
STATELAW4* 0.0310936 0.1735754 0.0543268 0.2266858 0.0229712 0.1498174
CONDO 0.1104684 0.3134814 0.1047885 0.3063136 0.1124540 0.3159361
MULTI 0.0733674 0.2607459 0.1183165 0.3230172 0.0576533 0.2330955
N_CCITY 0.5213038 0.4995598 0.5780545 0.4939229 0.5014639 0.5000166
RURAL 0.1139726 0.3177869 0.1185312 0.3232708 0.1123790 0.3158440
FULL_DOC 0.5921682 0.4914453 0.5267339 0.4993384 0.6150439 0.4866032
PREPAY 0.7409612 0.4381191 NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE 11.2625987 7.3445345 13.9992270 8.1215011 10.3058779 6.7979462
HISPANIC_STATE 12.9946379 10.9334054 10.7371699 8.1750870 13.7838451 11.6433459
AGENCY_CODE1** 0.0730893 0.2602903 0.0459523 0.2094042 0.0825764 0.2752512
AGENCY_CODE2** 0.0136278 0.1159431 0.0193257 0.1376820 0.0116358 0.1072438
AGENCY_CODE3** 0.1232618 0.3287466 0.0839596 0.2773570 0.1370017 0.3438621
AGENCY_CODE4** 0.0086773 0.0927494 0.0073008 0.0851416 0.0091585 0.0952642
Q2 0.2995884 0.4580904 0.2883831 0.4530589 0.3035057 0.4597889
Q3 0.3478696 0.4763076 0.3459309 0.4757219 0.3485474 0.4765282
Q4 0.2077539 0.4057110 0.2329826 0.4227766 0.1989340 0.3992133
Table A.6. Descriptive Statistics for Table A.5 Analyses
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LOANS INCLUDED: 2/28 Adjustable
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
2-Year Prepayment Penalties
Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages 38
Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value
INTERCEPT 15.8297 1.4007  <.0001 11.6955 2.5423 <.0001 16.0805 1.7312 <.0001
BLACK 0.3631 0.0841  <.0001 0.2117 0.1364 0.1207 0.4801 0.1091 <.0001
HISPANIC 0.1008 0.0991  0.3095 0.2537 0.1617 0.1167 0.0688 0.1286 0.5929
MONTHLY INCOME 0.000015 0.000011  0.1433 -1.91E-6 0.000021 0.9265 -2.32E-6 0.000011 0.8345
LTV 0.0414 0.00243  <.0001 0.0667 0.00537 <.0001 0.0547 0.00346 <.0001
FICO -0.0252 0.000736  <.0001 -0.0250 0.00118 <.0001 -0.0265 0.000953 <.0001
ORIG_AMT -0.00002 7.162E-7  <.0001 -0.00001 1.599E-6 <.0001 -0.00001 8.293E-7 <.0001
CREDIT_SPREAD 1.7978 1.3217  0.1738 0.0965 2.2935 0.9664 2.8682 1.6516 0.0824
YIELD_CURVE -0.9365 0.3945  0.0176 0.0820 0.7003 0.9068 -1.4983 0.4870 0.0021
HPI_VOL -0.00865 0.00665  0.1934 -0.00866 0.0144 0.5480 -0.00168 0.00907 0.8531
RATE_VOL -1.1198 1.8260  0.5397 2.5437 3.1980 0.4264 -2.9463 2.2781 0.1959
CDIV2 0.4600 0.1742  0.0083 0.7075 0.4341 0.1032 0.1009 0.2254 0.6545
CDIV3 0.2478 0.1990  0.2130 -0.4372 0.5200 0.4005 0.5203 0.2494 0.0370
CDIV4 0.2166 0.2099  0.3021 0.7391 0.4952 0.1355 -0.1361 0.2843 0.6320
CDIV5 0.5643 0.1961  0.0040 0.3421 0.6355 0.5904 0.5536 0.2197 0.0117
CDIV6 0.3284 0.2463  0.1824 0.0935 0.7645 0.9026 0.3345 0.2948 0.2565
CDIV7 0.4656 0.2785  0.0946 -0.0738 0.7595 0.9226 0.3011 0.3513 0.3914
CDIV8 0.0417 0.2382  0.8609 -0.0877 0.8053 0.9133 0.0119 0.2890 0.9671
CDIV9 -0.1919 0.2097  0.3601 -0.1810 0.5917 0.7596 -0.2426 0.2507 0.3332
STATELAW2* -0.2214 0.1322  0.0939 -0.1506 0.2686 0.5751 0.0631 0.1815 0.7279
STATELAW3* -0.2917 0.1060  0.0059 -0.3247 0.2060 0.1150 -0.1812 0.1391 0.1927
STATELAW4* -0.0467 0.2154  0.8284 0.2262 0.5089 0.6567 0.1131 0.2588 0.6620
CONDO 0.0690 0.1345  0.6079 0.2613 0.2348 0.2658 0.0367 0.1682 0.8274
MULTI 0.2138 0.1649  0.1947 0.1121 0.2613 0.6678 0.3787 0.2159 0.0795
N_CCITY -0.0760 0.0713  0.2868 -0.0291 0.1261 0.8178 -0.1521 0.0885 0.0858
RURAL 0.2939 0.0984  0.0028 0.5225 0.1679 0.0019 0.1335 0.1252 0.2863
FULL_DOC -1.0787 0.0771  <.0001 -1.2074 0.1353 <.0001 -1.1375 0.0967 <.0001
PREPAY -0.3831 0.0775  <.0001 NA NA NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE -0.00150 0.00693  0.8281 0.0224 0.0199 0.2600 -0.00345 0.00844 0.6826
HISPANIC_STATE -0.00438 0.00525  0.4035 0.0123 0.0145 0.3954 -0.0171 0.00706 0.0156
AGENCY_CODE1** 0.0117 0.1200  0.9226 -0.4147 0.2034 0.0414 0.2008 0.1536 0.1911
AGENCY_CODE2** -0.0886 0.1293  0.4932 -0.1293 0.2030 0.5242 -0.1307 0.1708 0.4443
AGENCY_CODE3** 0.2738 0.1460  0.0608 0.00968 0.2701 0.9714 0.3091 0.1762 0.0794
AGENCY_CODE4** 0.5487 0.2944  0.0623 0.8479 0.4803 0.0775 0.3273 0.3880 0.3989
Q2 -0.7977 0.1233  <.0001 -0.9243 0.2193 <.0001 -0.7621 0.1524 <.0001
Q3 -0.2754 0.2427  0.2565 -0.5904 0.4226 0.1624 -0.1372 0.3045 0.6522
Q4 -0.2275 0.3787  0.5480 -0.3493 0.6351 0.5823 -0.2133 0.4840 0.6594
Summary Statistics
Number of Lenders 37 35 28
Number of 
Observations 8799 2881 5918
System R-Squared NA 0.4703 0.5405
( 3SLS Only)
Nagelkerke R-Squared 0.5426 0.5480 0.5357
Cox-Snell R-Squared 0.3857 0.4057 0.3679
KS Statistic (all) 61.97 60.55 63.19
KS Statistic 
(Black=1) 58.58 55.23 64.82
KS Statistic 
(Hispanic=1) 65.99 62.10 66.94
KS Statistic 
(Black=0, Hispanic=0) 60.86 61.74 60.96
Table A.7. 30-Year Fixed-Rate Refinance Loans
Dependent Variable: 1 if APR_Spread Exceeds HMDA Reporting Threshold; 0 otherwise.
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
3-Year Prepayment Penalties
Mean Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
HMDA_THRESHOLD 0.3116263 0.4631843 0.4026380 0.4905142 0.2673200 0.4425982
BLACK 0.1635413 0.3698798 0.1975009 0.3981825 0.1470091 0.3541449
HISPANIC 0.1663825 0.3724448 0.1516834 0.3587761 0.1735384 0.3787440
MONTHLY INCOME 5027.29 3753.60 5224.43 4042.48 4931.33 3601.05
LTV 74.3785794 17.0294092 74.7270878 15.4111633 74.2089186 17.7627082
FICO 622.1256961 61.5483839 617.7913919 64.7890156 624.2357215 59.7994058
ORIG_AMT 144755.23 75417.42 134762.92 74586.43 149619.68 75346.79
CREDIT_SPREAD 0.7598307 0.0470648 0.7587851 0.0469742 0.7603396 0.0471045
YIELD_CURVE 2.4846414 0.4291438 2.4466366 0.4417362 2.5031430 0.4216777
HPI_VOL 16.3065975 11.3412298 12.5721322 10.4541944 18.1246094 11.3119061
RATE_VOL 0.2179913 0.1247948 0.2280747 0.1287663 0.2130825 0.1225259
CDIV2 0.1170588 0.3215086 0.2054842 0.4041251 0.0740115 0.2618117
CDIV3 0.1138766 0.3176794 0.1277334 0.3338507 0.1071308 0.3093056
CDIV4 0.0429594 0.2027772 0.0527595 0.2235917 0.0381886 0.1916675
CDIV5 0.1717241 0.3771619 0.1818813 0.3858136 0.1667793 0.3728102
CDIV6 0.0371633 0.1891726 0.0156196 0.1240199 0.0476512 0.2130452
CDIV7 0.1525173 0.3595421 0.2877473 0.4527913 0.0866847 0.2813962
CDIV8 0.0640982 0.2449417 0.0430406 0.2029838 0.0743494 0.2623609
CDIV9 0.2007046 0.4005503 0.0458174 0.2091252 0.2761068 0.4471081
STATELAW2* 0.3811797 0.4857042 0.4015967 0.4903063 0.3712403 0.4831774
STATELAW3* 0.3420843 0.4744346 0.3703575 0.4829843 0.3283204 0.4696418
STATELAW4* 0.0281850 0.1655105 0.0114544 0.1064288 0.0363298 0.1871254
CONDO 0.0634163 0.2437241 0.0541479 0.2263485 0.0679284 0.2516442
MULTI 0.0505739 0.2191385 0.0558834 0.2297362 0.0479892 0.2137614
N_CCITY 0.5247187 0.4994170 0.4887192 0.4999595 0.5422440 0.4982543
RURAL 0.1297875 0.3360886 0.1384936 0.3454773 0.1255492 0.3313686
FULL_DOC 0.7371292 0.4402179 0.7125998 0.4526284 0.7490706 0.4335846
PREPAY 0.6725764 0.4692999 NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE 11.2374702 7.7395043 13.5127039 7.4202481 10.1298412 7.6497172
HISPANIC_STATE 14.7443232 12.2263634 16.7137452 12.6442809 13.7855694 11.9013573
AGENCY_CODE1** 0.0814865 0.2735964 0.1263450 0.3322955 0.0596485 0.2368545
AGENCY_CODE2** 0.0636436 0.2441308 0.0694203 0.2542117 0.0608314 0.2390409
AGENCY_CODE3** 0.0479600 0.2136938 0.0395696 0.1949796 0.0520446 0.2221358
AGENCY_CODE4** 0.0100011 0.0995100 0.0124957 0.1111027 0.0087868 0.0933328
Q2 0.3809524 0.4856485 0.3668865 0.4820388 0.3877999 0.4872897
Q3 0.2634390 0.4405235 0.2776814 0.4479331 0.2565056 0.4367410
Q4 0.1572906 0.3640952 0.1794516 0.3837966 0.1465022 0.3536388
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Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics for Table A.7 Analyses
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LOANS INCLUDED: 30-Year Fixed-Rate Refinance Loans
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
3-Year Prepayment Penalties
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Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value Coeff Std Err P-Value
INTERCEPT 16.2362 0.8645 <.0001 12.7901 1.4367 <.0001 16.0448 1.0979 <.0001
BLACK 0.1486 0.0532 0.0052 0.0386 0.0845 0.6481 0.1599 0.0689 0.0202
HISPANIC -0.0679 0.0569 0.2328 -0.1694 0.0958 0.0771 -0.0613 0.0711 0.3891
MONTHLY INCOME 0.000018 5.524E-6 0.0015 1.769E-6 3.22E-6 0.5827 -0.00001 6.581E-6 0.0579
LTV 0.0297 0.00152 <.0001 0.0600 0.00373 <.0001 0.0641 0.00319 <.0001
FICO -0.0210 0.000446 <.0001 -0.0225 0.000771 <.0001 -0.0249 0.000619 <.0001
ORIG_AMT -9.27E-6 3.472E-7 <.0001 -5.89E-6 5.056E-7 <.0001 -4.77E-6 2.799E-7 <.0001
CREDIT_SPREAD -5.3585 0.8370 <.0001 -4.8445 1.3923 0.0005 -6.0564 1.0591 <.0001
YIELD_CURVE -0.4180 0.2455 0.0887 0.0104 0.4135 0.9800 -0.6611 0.3071 0.0314
HPI_VOL 0.00714 0.00399 0.0733 0.00904 0.00897 0.3136 0.0142 0.00513 0.0057
RATE_VOL 7.1831 1.1513 <.0001 8.2869 1.9114 <.0001 6.6298 1.4509 <.0001
CDIV2 0.3503 0.0908 0.0001 0.3687 0.2216 0.0961 0.4139 0.1377 0.0027
CDIV3 0.4561 0.1126 <.0001 0.2167 0.2940 0.4610 0.7458 0.1390 <.0001
CDIV4 0.3843 0.1158 0.0009 0.4965 0.2816 0.0779 0.4343 0.1501 0.0038
CDIV5 0.3924 0.1163 0.0007 0.6267 0.3485 0.0722 0.3383 0.1324 0.0106
CDIV6 0.5309 0.1566 0.0007 -0.0242 0.4663 0.9585 0.7907 0.1809 <.0001
CDIV7 0.8109 0.1841 <.0001 1.2648 0.4375 0.0038 0.7804 0.2288 0.0006
CDIV8 0.3328 0.1407 0.0180 0.6997 0.4382 0.1103 0.3919 0.1729 0.0234
CDIV9 0.3854 0.1233 0.0018 1.0825 0.3095 0.0005 0.2833 0.1557 0.0689
STATELAW2* -0.0306 0.0792 0.6997 -0.1880 0.1674 0.2613 0.000409 0.1061 0.9969
STATELAW3* -0.1378 0.0549 0.0121 -0.1398 0.0971 0.1498 -0.0689 0.0786 0.3808
STATELAW4* -0.0598 0.1127 0.5957 -0.0372 0.2178 0.8645 0.2412 0.1903 0.2050
CONDO -0.1800 0.0704 0.0105 -0.0442 0.1312 0.7361 -0.1988 0.0841 0.0181
MULTI 0.1116 0.0861 0.1950 0.2234 0.1225 0.0683 0.0703 0.1232 0.5684
N_CCITY 0.0159 0.0441 0.7194 -0.0136 0.0819 0.8681 0.0221 0.0531 0.6777
RURAL 0.0774 0.0660 0.2408 0.2139 0.1134 0.0593 0.0145 0.0822 0.8595
FULL_DOC -0.7106 0.0427 <.0001 -0.6839 0.0727 <.0001 -0.7708 0.0537 <.0001
PREPAY -0.3096 0.0486 <.0001 NA NA NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE 0.00227 0.00416 0.5859 -0.00314 0.0115 0.7845 0.000933 0.00528 0.8599
HISPANIC_STATE -0.0148 0.00358 <.0001 -0.0240 0.00892 0.0072 -0.0122 0.00476 0.0100
AGENCY_CODE1** -0.4308 0.0951 <.0001 -0.5866 0.2003 0.0034 -0.4432 0.1097 <.0001
AGENCY_CODE2** 1.0246 0.1226 <.0001 0.9463 0.2015 <.0001 1.0933 0.1557 <.0001
AGENCY_CODE3** 3.1346 0.1028 <.0001 3.4348 0.2349 <.0001 3.0866 0.1169 <.0001
AGENCY_CODE4** -1.5514 0.1403 <.0001 -1.4069 0.2626 <.0001 -1.6542 0.1667 <.0001
Q2 -1.1222 0.0778 <.0001 -1.1334 0.1308 <.0001 -1.1306 0.0978 <.0001
Q3 -1.2237 0.1507 <.0001 -1.3236 0.2479 <.0001 -1.1872 0.1912 <.0001
Q4 -1.3254 0.2291 <.0001 -1.3604 0.3858 0.0004 -1.3964 0.2875 <.0001
Summary Statistics
Number of Lenders 32 32 30
Number of 
Observations 18470 6520 11950
System R-Squared
(3SLS Only) NA 0.4013 0.4115
Nagelkerke R-Squared 0.4443 0.4199 0.4582
Cox-Snell R-Squared 0.3304 0.3086 0.3421
KS Statistic 
(all) 52.97 52.50 53.33
KS Statistic 
(Black=1) 53.47 50.73 55.66
KS Statistic 
(Hispanic=1) 55.70 60.69 53.27
KS Statistic 
(Black=0, Hispanic=0) 52.22 51.21 52.63
Table A.9. 2/28 Adjustable-Rate Refinance Loans
Dependent Variable: 1 if APR_Spread Exceeds HMDA Reporting Threshold; 0 otherwise.
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
2-Year Prepayment Penalties
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Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
HMDA_THRESHOLD 0.5799675 0.4935771 0.6199387 0.4854388 0.5581590 0.4966268
BLACK 0.1720087 0.3773982 0.1993865 0.3995698 0.1570711 0.3638830
HISPANIC 0.1558744 0.3627460 0.1460123 0.3531456 0.1612552 0.3677816
MONTHLY INCOME 5353.42 7393.47 5642.15 9599.00 5195.88 5843.90
LTV 77.5913806 14.2486355 76.6494156 13.9957800 78.1053230 14.3592691
FICO 581.9901462 52.1422822 579.9953988 52.4949334 583.0784937 51.9187601
ORIG_AMT 158127.28 76419.73 157820.78 79767.94 158294.50 74532.41
CREDIT_SPREAD 0.7644564 0.0475109 0.7638696 0.0484686 0.7647766 0.0469792
YIELD_CURVE 2.3898370 0.4290033 2.3766656 0.4343851 2.3970234 0.4258848
HPI_VOL 17.1887053 11.3851665 16.7198476 11.1623787 17.4445172 11.4973055
RATE_VOL 0.2478475 0.1249930 0.2516119 0.1257642 0.2457937 0.1245275
CDIV2 0.1635625 0.3698881 0.3483129 0.4764723 0.0627615 0.2425437
CDIV3 0.1707634 0.3763123 0.1815951 0.3855400 0.1648536 0.3710639
CDIV4 0.0634001 0.2436878 0.0562883 0.2304954 0.0672803 0.2505174
CDIV5 0.1658365 0.3719439 0.1621166 0.3685860 0.1678661 0.3737630
CDIV6 0.0304277 0.1717657 0.0105828 0.1023349 0.0412552 0.1988883
CDIV7 0.0831619 0.2761342 0.1378834 0.3448040 0.0533054 0.2246513
CDIV8 0.0743368 0.2623252 0.0286810 0.1669211 0.0992469 0.2990057
CDIV9 0.1436925 0.3507871 0.0213190 0.1444566 0.2104603 0.4076526
STATELAW2* 0.2772063 0.4476313 0.2266871 0.4187206 0.3047699 0.4603292
STATELAW3* 0.3453167 0.4754843 0.4110429 0.4920607 0.3094561 0.4622888
STATELAW4* 0.0391987 0.1940727 0.0610429 0.2394274 0.0272803 0.1629059
CONDO 0.0795885 0.2706624 0.0633436 0.2435985 0.0884519 0.2839628
MULTI 0.0582025 0.2341323 0.0848160 0.2786290 0.0436820 0.2043952
N_CCITY 0.5621007 0.4961419 0.5857362 0.4926322 0.5492050 0.4975938
RURAL 0.1185707 0.3232914 0.1259202 0.3317849 0.1145607 0.3185043
FULL_DOC 0.6724418 0.4693354 0.6714724 0.4697138 0.6729707 0.4691477
PREPAY 0.6469951 0.4779171 NA NA NA NA
BLACK_STATE 11.4531402 7.7867151 13.7248160 7.5573588 10.2136987 7.6292737
HISPANIC_STATE 12.3859394 10.6503757 13.2491411 10.0689991 11.9149707 10.9262702
AGENCY_CODE1** 0.0371413 0.1891131 0.0225460 0.1484624 0.0451046 0.2075422
AGENCY_CODE2** 0.0229561 0.1497677 0.0250000 0.1561369 0.0218410 0.1461703
AGENCY_CODE3** 0.0916622 0.2885563 0.0713190 0.2573767 0.1027615 0.3036598
AGENCY_CODE4** 0.0171088 0.1296805 0.0130368 0.1134408 0.0193305 0.1376897
Q2 0.2905793 0.4540420 0.2763804 0.4472415 0.2983264 0.4575426
Q3 0.3397401 0.4736337 0.3411043 0.4741167 0.3389958 0.4733882
Q4 0.2006497 0.4004973 0.2118098 0.4086221 0.1945607 0.3958787
Table A.10. Descriptive Statistics for Table A.9 Analyses
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LOANS INCLUDED: 30-Year Fixed-Rate Refinance Loans
Independent Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Variables Base Model Expanded Model, 
No Prepayment Penalties
Expanded Model, With 
2-Year Prepayment Penalties
*The state law variables rely on the categories created by Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Anthony Sanders in their paper “The Effect of Conforming
Loan Status on Mortgage Yield Spreads: A Loan Level Analysis.”  These categories are based on the legal environment in states with regard to
judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgement. The states are grouped as follows:  
STATELAW2 = AK, AZ, CA, ID, OK, ME, MN, MT, NC, OR, SD, TX, WA
STATELAW3 = CT, DE, FL, IL, IN, KS, KY, NJ, OH, PA, SC, VT
STATELAW4 = LA, ND, WI
(reference category = AL, AR, DC, GA, HI, MO, IA, MA, MD, MI, MS, RI, NE, NH, NM, NV, NY, TN, UT, VA, WV, WY, CO)
*The agency codes reflect the regulatory agency to which the lender reports. The codes represent the following:
AGENCY_CODE1 = OCC
AGENCY_CODE2 = FRS
AGENCY_CODE3 = FDIC
AGENCY_CODE4 = OTS
(reference category = HUD)
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APPENDIX 7: ODDS AND LIKELIHOODS
When logistical regressions are used to test the relationship between categorical independent vari-
ables and a binary dependent variable  (in our case, the relationship between race, ethnicity and
whether the APR spread exceeded HMDA’s reporting threshold), the most straightforward measure
of the “impact” of the independent variable on the dependent variable is the odds ratio. While not
often used outside of this type of analysis, odds ratios are fairly easy to understand and are closely
related to likelihood ratios.
Difference Between Odds and Likelihood 
In analyses of social outcomes, likelihoods are often used to draw conclusions. The likelihood of a
particular event happening is the same as the probability that that event will happen. For example,
if 40 percent of all subprime borrowers received a high-APR loan in 2004, then the likelihood that
a randomly chosen subprime borrower received such a loan is 40 percent. The odds of an event hap-
pening, however, is equal to the probability of the event happening divided by the probability that
the event will not happen. Thus, the odds of that randomly-selected borrower receiving a high-APR
loan is simply equal to the likelihood that he will receive a high-APR loan divided by the likeli-
hood that he will not. To put it in basic mathematic terms:
Odds = P/(1-P), where P is the probability or likelihood of a particular event happening and 
(1-P) is, therefore, the probability of that event not happening.
In our example above, the odds of a randomly selected subprime borrower receiving a high-APR
loan is equal to 0.4/(1-0.4), or 67 percent.
By extension, an odds ratio, therefore, is simply the ratio between the odds for different types of bor-
rowers.  If, hypothetically, the probability of an African-American borrower receiving a high-APR
loan is 30 percent, the odds for that borrower is 0.3/0.7 or 0.43. If the probability for a similarly-
situated white borrower receiving a high-APR loan is 20 percent, the odds for that borrower is
0.2/0.8 or 0.25. The odds ratio between black and white borrowers, therefore, is 0.43/0.25 or 1.72.
The interpretation of this odds ratio is as follows:  The odds of an African-American borrower
receiving a high-APR loan are 72 percent greater than those of a similarly-situated white borrower.
Odds ratios can be directly computed from logistic regressions. However, the underlying odds and,
therefore, likelihoods cannot be directly calculated. This is why odds ratios, despite being less intu-
itive measures than likelihoods, are generally used when describing results from logistic regressions.
To convert the results into likelihoods, which are more intuitive, we conduct a simulation where we
use our model coefficients to compute the average predicted probabilities of receiving a higher-rate
loan for the African-American and Latino borrowers in our dataset and compare those to the aver-
age predicted probabilities for the same borrowers if they had been white. So, for our example, if for
a specific loan product the average predicted probability of receiving a higher-rate APR was 30 per-
cent for the African-American borrower in our dataset but would have been 20 percent if those
same borrowers had been white, our “increased likelihood” would be (0.3-0.2)/0.2 or 50 percent.
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1  12 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq.
2  12 U.S.C. § 2901 et. seq.
3  15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.
4  12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a.  
5   See, e.g., Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved With Good Congressional Intentions:  Usury Deregulation
and the Subprime Home Equity Market, Vol. 51, South Carolina Law Review, pp535–539, App. 1, pp576–587; Alan M. White, Risk-
Based Mortgage Pricing:  Present and Future Research, Vol. 15, Housing Policy Debate, pp512–513 (2004).
6  For a detailed timeline of key events in fair lending, see Fair Lending Timeline, Fried Frank (September 27, 2002), at
www.ffhsj.com/fairlend/timtest.htm.
7  For a more detailed summary of the evolution of HMDA, see Joseph Kolar & Jonathan D. Jerison, The Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act: Its History, Evolution, and Limitations, Buckley Kolar LLP (March 7, 2005), at http://www.buckleykolar.com/publications/docu-
ments/HomeMortgageDisclosureActbyJoeKolarandJonJerison.pdf.
8  For an overview of current HMDA reporting requirements, see A Guide to HMDA Reporting: Getting it Right!, Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (December 2003), at http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/2004guide.pdf.
9  In prior years, higher-cost loans were identified based on whether the originator was on a list produced by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) of predominantly subprime lenders.  See HUD Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender
List, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (March 31, 2005), at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html.
Although using lenders as a proxy for subprime loan status was useful, it risked some degree of misclassification since, for example,
some predominantly prime lenders also originate subprime loans.
10   Alicia H. Munnell, Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne & James McEneaney, Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA
Data, Vol. 86, No. 1, The American Economic Review pp25-53 (March 1996).
11   Critics of the Boston Fed study have suggested that the estimated impact on race and ethnicity could have been biased because of
omitted variables, data errors, and potential problems with the model used.  Nonetheless, the Boston Fed study remains one of the
most comprehensive and robust analyses of discrimination in the mortgage market.  For an excellent overview of the study and the
critiques leveled against it, see Stephen L. Ross & John Yinger, Does Discrimination in Mortgage Lending Exist? The Boston Fed Study and
Its Critics, in Mortgage Lending Discrimination: A Review of Existing Evidence (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore, eds., The
Urban Institute, June 1999), at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/mortgage_lending.pdf. 
12  Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of the
Treasury (June 2000), at http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html. 
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Reports/Center%20for%20Community%20Change%20Report.pdf. 
14  Paul Calem, Kevin Gillen & Susan Wachter, The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, Vol. 29, No. 4, Journal of
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16   The 2004 Fair Lending Disparities: Stubborn and Persistent, National Community Reinvestment Coalition (April 2005), at
http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press_releases/documents/HMDApricing_Report.pdf; The High Cost of Credit: Disparities in High-
Priced Refinance Loans to Minority Homeowners in 125 American Cities, ACORN Fair Housing (September 27, 2005), at
http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=9758; and Allen Fishbein & Patrick Woodall, Subprime Cities: Patterns of Geographic Disparity in
Subprime Lending, Consumer Federation of America (September 8, 2005), at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Subprimecities090805.pdf. 
17  See, e.g., Experts: Prepare for Legal, Regulatory Fallout From HMDA Data, Mortgage Banking (October 2005), at http://www.all-
business.com/periodicals/article/606224-1.html. 
18  Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner & Robert E. Cook, New Information Reported Under HMDA and Its Implication in Fair Lending
Enforcement, Federal Reserve Bulletin (Summer 2005), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/3-05hmda.pdf. 
NOTES
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19  The Fed study uses mutually exclusive categories when comparing borrowers by race and ethnicity.  Specifically, they compare
African-Americans, regardless of ethnicity, to Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic whites.
20  Specifically, the disparity ratios of higher-rate lending to African-Americans to that of whites drops approximately 15% in both
purchase (3.7 to 3.1) and refinance (2.7 to 2.3) loans.  For Latino white borrowers, the ratio drops 17% (2.3 to 1.9) for purchase loans
and only 7% (1.5 to 1.4) in the case of refinance loans.  See Tables 10A and 10B, Avery et al, note 18, p34.  
21 Even after both the borrower and lender adjustments, African-American borrowers remain 40% and 80% more likely than white
borrowers to receive a higher-cost loan for refinance and purchase purposes, respectively.  For white Hispanic borrowers, the correspon-
ding increased likelihoods decrease but persist at 10% (1.1 times) and 30% (1.3 times).  See Tables 10A and 10B, Avery et al., note
18, p34.  
22  We made this estimation by comparing loan volume in the proprietary database with several estimates of overall subprime 
mortgage volume from third parties.
23  See App. 1 for detailed information on our matching methodology.
24  See App. 2 for comparisons of average values of variables between the proprietary database and the merged dataset.
25  Specifically, we merged in information on Treasury and corporate bond rates from the Federal Reserve, state race and ethnic com-
position from the 2000 Census, and state housing price index from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
Categories of state laws with respect to judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment were from Brent Ambrose, Michael LaCour-Little
& Anthony Sanders, The Effect of Conforming Loan Status on Mortgage Yield Spreads: A Loan Level Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 4, Real Estate
Economics, pp541-569 (2004).
26  See Ambrose et al., note 25.  
27  We eliminated any loans with FICO scores less than 300 or greater than 850, assuming that such scores were erroneous.
28  Unlike the Fed paper, the sample size in this research was not large enough to permit controlling for originating lender.  Instead,
we control for the regulating agency of the originating lender, which controls for the type of lender if not the specific originator.
29  Limiting our original dataset to loans in these four product categories yielded 93,659 loans.  When further selections were made to
ensure loans were secured by a first-lien, lacked private mortgage insurance, were below jumbo threshold, and were made to either a
Latino, African-American, or white borrower, we were left with 50,031 loans.
30  Like the Federal Reserve analysis in Avery, et al., New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending
Enforcement (see note 18), we exclude from the analysis all loans in which the loan application was submitted prior to January 1,
2004.  We also exclude loans for which the variables race, ethnicity and sex were all coded as “not applicable” as these loans are pre-
sumed to be for commercial, agricultural, or business purposes. 
31  Jumbo loans are loans above the maximum limit for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  In 2004, the maximum limit was
$333,700 in most states.  See Fannie Mae Announces Higher 2004 Conforming Loan Limit of $333,700; Higher Limit Will Bring Mortgage
Savings to More Americans, Fannie Mae (November 25, 2003), at http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2003/2860.jhtml. 
32  Odds ratios are the convention because the exponential of the coefficient produced by the logistical regressions is the odds ratio
corresponding to a one-unit change in the variable.
33  See App. 5 for more detail about APR.
34  For a discussion of this sort of targeting, see Elizabeth Renuart, Toward One Fair and Competitive Mortgage Market: Suggested Reforms
in a Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, Vol. 82 Texas Law Review p421et seq. (December 2003), and Kathleen C. Engel
& Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets Revisited, Vol. 82 Texas Law Review p439 et seq. (December 2003).
35 See App. 5 for an explanation of how APR tends to understate the cost of fees for borrowers. See, also, National Consumer Law
Center, The Cost of Credit: Regulation, Preemption and Industry Abuses § 5.5.2.2.1 (3rd Ed. 2005) (example of a small mortgage with 10
points at 15% note rate, 25% APR; prepaid at two years costs borrower equivalent of 29.5%--nearly double the note rate and almost
5% more than the APR).
36  2006 Predatory Lending Update: Breaking News on the Federal, State, and Local Fronts and How It Impacts You, Inside Mortgage
Finance Publications (transcript of remarks by Iowa Attorney General Thomas J. Miller during April 20, 2006 audio conference).
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37  See untitled press release, Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (May 27, 2004) (announcing $70 million Citigroup settle-
ment), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2004/20040527/default.htm; Citigroup Settles FTC Charges
Against the Associates Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (September 19, 2002),
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.htm; and Press Release, Ameriquest Announces Agreement with States, Ameriquest (January
23, 2006), at http://www.ameriquestmortgage.com/releaseArticle.html?news=news20060123.
38  We caution that, while the ranges of African-American-to-white and Latino-to-white disparities presented here appear to differ in
magnitude, the 95% confidence interval of the underlying odds ratio estimates frequently overlap (e.g., for the nine odds ratios that
are significantly different from 1 and associated with the Latino or African-American variables, eight of them have a 95% confidence
interval including 1.55).  In other words, while the estimates presented here are helpful, the magnitude of African-American-to-white
disparities are largely indistinguishable from Latino-to-white disparities. 
39  See discussion above in Section III.  Also, we recognize that our analytic framework treats the risk factors on rate sheets as legiti-
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